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The New Gender Panic: Reflections on Sex
Scandals and the Military
Martha Chamallast
The legal regulation of sexual conduct is a precarious en-
terprise. At times, it appears that laws governing sexual con-
duct are grossly underenforced. We are used to statistics that
tell us that only a small fraction of rapes are reported to police1
and that relatively few victims of sexual harassment have the
temerity to complain about their mistreatment to their em-
ployers.2 From these accounts, it looks like we need more legal
intervention and far greater support for the victims of sexual
abuse. At other times, it seems that there is a public hysteria
centered on sex. We learn about the pain and suffering caused
to those falsely accused of child molestation 3 and are told that
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1. See DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER 246-48 (1989) ("Recent
studies suggest that rape is the most underreported of all violent crimes.");
NATIONAL VICTIM CENTER & CRIME VICTIMS RESEARCH AND TREATMENT
CENTER, RAPE IN AziERICA: A REPORT TO THE NATION 4-6 (1992) (only 12% of
victims report the rape to the police within 24 hours; another 4% report after
24 hours, and 84% never report at all).
2. See NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH ON WOMEN, SEXUAL
HARASSMENT: REsEARCH AND RESOuRCES 10 (1991) (reporting a study finding
that only 1-7% of women who report harassment in surveys actually file a
formal complaint; only 5% of federal employees who stated in a 1987 survey
that they had been harassed filed a formal complaint or requested an investi-
gation).
3. See, e.g., Terese L. Fitzpatrick, Innocent Until Proven Guilty: Shallow
Words for the Falsely Accused in a Criminal Prosecution for Child Sexual
Abuse, 12 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 175, 196-99 (1991); Deborah Patterson,
Note, The Other Victim: The Falsely Accused Parent in a Sexual Abuse Cus-
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public officials find it hard to do their jobs because they are
constantly beset by allegations of sexual misconduct in their
private lives.4 The solution then seems to be deregulation of
sexual conduct, with perennial calls for more privacy and less
law.
In the 1980s, legal feminists argued over the meaning of
equality.5 Some emphasized the importance of being treated
the same as men. Others stressed that women's different so-
cial status in society meant that we often needed to be treated
differently to secure justice. Wendy Williams worried that "we
can't have it both ways"6 and urged feminists to choose a con-
sistent strategy. At the close of this century, however, most le-
gal feminists have learned to live with inconsistencies and
complexity. The dominant feminist approaches are now prag-
matic, starting from the realization that because sexism is such
a complicated, multi-faceted and ever-changing phenomenon,
no one theory or strategy could ever be a sufficient response.7
In matters of sex, this means that we can experience the
worst of both worlds: legal protections against sexual abuse can
be woefully inadequate and yet, at times, there can be a dra-
matic overregulation of private sexual conduct. More so than
in other areas of law, the legal regulation of sexual conduct has
been characterized by inattention and panic, minimization and
overreaction. Despite its messiness, it sometimes makes sense
to argue simultaneously for more regulation and for more pri-
vacy. The choice of strategy is contingent; it depends on a close
examination of particular contexts.
tody Case, 30 J. FAM. L. 919, 924-26 (1991).
4. See Jackie Calmes, White House Tries to Stick to Business Amid
Scandal, WALL ST. J., Mar. 30, 1998, at A20 (discussing time spent on damage
control).
5. Many of the major feminist contributions in the equality debate ap-
pear in anthologies of feminist legal thought. See FEMINIsT LEGAL THEORY:
READINGS IN LAW AND GENDER 15-156 (Katharine T. Bartlett & Rosanne
Kennedy eds., 1991); FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE 17-135 (Patricia Smith ed.,
1993); FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: FOUNDATIONS 121-334 (D. Kelly Weisberg
ed., 1993).
6. Wendy W. Williams, The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Cul-
ture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. RPTR. 175, 196 (1983). To be
precise, Williams urged feminists to consider that "[i]f we can't have it both
ways, we need to think carefully about which way we want to have it." Id.
7. See, for example, Marina Angel's statement: "The debate on the na-
ture of equality has focused on whether we should have an equality of same-
ness or an equality of differences. We can and should have both." Marina
Angel, Susan Glaspell's Trifles and a Jury of Her Peers: Woman Abuse in a
Literary and Legal Context, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 779, 796 (1997).
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This article examines the legal regulation of sexual con-
duct in the military context. I chose this topic because the
military has recently been the site of numerous sex scandals
and it is a rather dramatic illustration of the inattention/panic
contradiction mentioned above. In some respects the military
context is atypical of the larger society. The military is re-
garded as one of the last bastions of male culture and it has a
special status under the law, complete with its own justice sys-
tem.8 Military prohibitions on sexual conduct differ from those
in the civilian world, particularly because members of the
armed service may not sue their "employer" in civil court for
violations of their civil rights,9 thus excluding private suits for
race and sex discrimination that have proved so important in
non-military life.10
Despite these important differences, my examination of
sex regulations within the military leads me to believe that the
military is a microcosm of the civilian world.' The tensions
and contradictions experienced more generally are clearly pre-
sent in the military context, often in exaggerated form. This
article explores three such parallels relating to sexual conduct.
The first example concerns the meaning of sexuality. We
know that in the "real" world, gay men and lesbians are often
forced to hide their sexual identity because they fear discrimi-
nation and ostracism.12 As a result, there is a tendency to un-
derestimate their presence, distorting cultural views about how
such persons behave and about the nature of sexuality gener-
ally. In the military context, the tendency to equate sexuality
with heterosexuality is even more pronounced. Gay and les-
bian service members are rendered nearly invisible because of
8. For a brief overview of some of the salient differences between the ci-
vilian and military systems of justice, see Jane Gross, Justice in the Military
Has Its Reasons, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1998, at A16.
9. See Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983) (military personnel may
not sue superior officer in Bivens-type action for race discrimination).
10. The courts have held that Title VII does not extend to suits by uni-
formed members of the armed services or applicants for enlistment. See, e.g.,
Johnson v. Alexander, 572 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1978).
11. I am indebted to Alan Michaels for this characterization of the mili-
tary as a microcosm of the larger society.
12. For a discussion of the ways in which gays and lesbians conceal their
sexual orientation and the costs of such concealment, see Marc A. Fajer, Can
Two Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes,
and Legal Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511,
592-602 (1992).
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their formal legal exclusion.13 This means that more so than in
the civilian world, the problem of managing sexualized conduct
in the military, particularly the problem of sexual harassment,
is apt to be treated as if it were a problem about heterosexual-
ity and women, rather than about the abuse of power.
A second example of how the military world both mirrors
and exaggerates trends in the larger society involves the
treatment of adultery. In the civilian context, adultery is
rarely the subject of criminal prosecutions. However, the
commission of adultery still carries enough disapproval to
tempt people to lie about their private sexual lives, sometimes
leading indirectly to trouble with the law. In comparison, in
the military, the commission of adultery is a crime. It can lead
directly to court-martial and imprisonment.
The third example focuses on the military's struggle with
sexual harassment, specifically the distance between the mili-
tary's announced policy of zero tolerance for sexual harassment
and the reports of widespread sexual abuse at military acade-
mies and training facilities. The military's struggle strikes me
as an especially clear-cut illustration of the dilemma faced
regularly by civilian employers. Inside and outside the mili-
tary, those in charge of workplaces and institutions insist that
sexual harassment is intolerable and against official policy, yet
they are plagued by an increasing number of claims by har-
assment victims. 1 4
This article first recounts some of the highlights of the re-
cent sex scandals that have beset the military and explains
13. Since 1993, the exclusion of gay men and lesbians in the military has
been embodied in what is known as the "don't ask, don't tell" policy. See Na-
tional Defense Authorization Act for FY '94, 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1994). The mili-
tary no longer questions applicants about their sexual orientation, but contin-
ues to discharge any member who has "engaged in, attempted to engage in, or
solicited another to engage in a homosexual act or acts." See Kenneth Wil-
liams, Gays in the Military: The Legal Issues, 28 U.S.F. L. REV. 919, 925(1994). Service members can prevent separation only if they can prove that
their conduct was not customary behavior and that they do not have a
"propensity or intent to engage in homosexual acts." Id. at 925 n.58. The
"don't tell" provision of the policy requires discharge of service members who
have stated that they are homosexual, unless they can prove that they do not
engage in homosexual conduct. See id. at 926.
14. Since the 1991 Hill/Thomas Senate hearings, the number of sexual
harassment complaints received by the EEOC has increased sharply. For ex-
ample, in its fiscal year 1992, there was a 50% increase. See EEOC Collected
$183 Million in Fiscal '92; Charges Jumped Sharply From A Year Earlier,
1992 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 232, at A-7 (Dec. 2, 1992).
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why what has occurred can aptly be described as a "gender
panic."Is I look closely at one response to the scandals which
would attempt to curtail sexual harassment and sexual mis-
conduct by segregating the sexes during basic training.16 In
this initial discussion, I also provide a glimpse of the military's
recent attempts to control consensual sex through prosecutions
of military personnel for adultery and fraternization. 17
The core of the article is devoted to a feminist interpreta-
tion and analysis of these various gender-related controversies.
I first look for an understanding of the gender panic in the
structural position of women in the armed services, employing
what is known as "tokenism theory" to explain the current
state of high anxiety about the status of women in the mili-
tary.18 The next section looks more in depth at the various
rules governing sexual misconduct in the military context, fo-
cusing on the punishment of adultery 19 and fraternization 2°
and on the special military doctrine of constructive force used
in rape cases.21 I show how the current rules are a curious
mixture of traditional and feminist approaches to regulation of
sexual conduct and argue for a reconceptualization of the basic
offenses. The final section examines the interrelationship be-
tween the policy of excluding gay men and lesbians from the
military and the military's approach to sexual harassment.22 I
advance the theory that the legal exclusion of homosexuals
constructs a presumptively heterosexual world and, in the
process, makes it easier to link sex and sexual misconduct to
the presence of women. In this section, I hypothesize that re-
cent calls to cure the problem of sexual harassment by the re-
segregation of women in basic training stem from a faulty logic
that confuses sexual harassment with heterosexuality, and
mistakes power for sexual desire.
15. See infra notes 53-63 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 23-24, 53-58, 64-66 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 76-115 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 126-50 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 179-206 and accompanying text.
2L See infra notes 151-78 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 218-57 and accompanying text.
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I. THE KASSEBAUM BAKER REPORT ON GENDER-
INTEGRATED TRAINING
In late 1997, a federal advisory committee chaired by for-
mer Senator Nancy Kassebaum Baker issued a report recom-
mending the resegregation of men and women during basic
training.23 The advisory report was the last in a series of rapid
developments that year relating to what had become the explo-
sive issue of gender and the military. If adopted, it would have
reversed a long-standing policy of gender-integrated basic
training in the Air Force (since 1976) and the more recent inte-
gration initiatives by the Navy (1993) and the Army (1994).
Currently only the Marines segregate men and women during
basic training.24
The principal impetus for the advisory report was the
scandal over widespread charges of sexual misconduct at Ab-
erdeen Proving Grounds, an advanced training center for the
Army in Maryland. The most visible of the perpetrators was
Staff Sergeant Delmar Simpson, who was convicted in April
1997 of raping six female recruits under his command. The
charges of rape were based on Simpson's use of "constructive
force" to compel the women to submit to have sex with him. As
a drill sergeant, Simpson had the authority to control the daily
lives of the trainees and the case against him rested on abuse
of that authority. According to the testimony of the recruits,
Simpson engaged in such coercive conduct as ordering a recruit
to disrobe in front of him, requiring a woman to report to his
office wearing no underwear, and forcing a woman to trade sex
as payback for Simpson's helping her avoid punishment for a
disciplinary infraction.25 The military jury found Simpson
23. See Federal Advisory Committee on Gender-Integrated Training and
Related Issues, Report of the Federal Advisory Committee on Gender-
Integrated Training and Related Issues (visited Jan. 11, 1998) <http://www.
defenselink.mil/pubs/git/report.html> [hereinafter Advisory Report].
24. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1998 and
1999: Hearing on H.R. 1119 Before the Subcomm. on Military Installations
and Facilities of the House Committee on National Security, 105th Cong. 2(1997) (statement of Nancy Duff Campbell, Co-President, National Women's
Law Center on Gender-Integrated Training) [hereinafter Statement of Nancy
Duff Campbell].
25. See Neil A. Lewis, Sergeant's Lawyers Start Case by Accusing 2 of His
Accusers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1997, at A12; Dana Priest & Jackie Spinner,
For Aberdeen Jury, A Murky Question of Human Relations, WASH. POST, Apr.
27, 1997, at Al.
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guilty of eighteen rape charges. He was sentenced to twenty-
five years imprisonment.26
Simpson was the first of several drill sergeants at Aber-
deen accused of sex crimes, which encompassed not only rape,
but also consensual sexual relationships in violation of the
military's ban on sex between a subordinate and a superior.
The investigation at Aberdeen led to similar investigations at
other training sites across the country and in Germany.27 A
hot line set up to receive complaints yielded thousands of calls.
It was painfully clear that the military's policy of "zero toler-
ance" for sexual harassment, which had gained visibility after
the Tailhook scandal in 1991, was not working well. 28
Even the Army's attempt to respond to the charges by ap-
pointing a blue ribbon commission to investigate the problem
of sexual harassment in the military backfired. One of the men
appointed to the Commission-Sergeant Major Gene McKin-
ney-was himself accused by a former aide of forcibly kissing
her and trying to pressure her into having sex. Once this alle-
gation was made public, five other women came forward with
similar complaints against McKinney.29 This new case was es-
pecially embarrassing for the Army because McKinney was its
highest ranking enlisted man and had even appeared in a
videotape for recruits in which he declared "[there is abso-
lutely no place for sexual harassment in America's Army."30
McKinney's court-martial for sexual misconduct, mal-
treatment of subordinates and obstruction of justice was high-
26. See Paul Richter, Army Sergeant Gets 25-Year Term, L.A. TIMES, May
7, 1997, at Al.
27. Specifically, Fort Leonard Wood and the U.S. installation in Darm-
stadt, Germany were the site of numerous allegations by female trainees. See
James Bone, Unreasonable Force, TIMES (London), Oct. 25, 1997, at 20.
28. The "zero tolerance" policy of the Navy had been made explicit in 1989
when Navy Secretary Lawrence Garrett I issued the following pronounce-
ment:
Sexual harassment is unacceptable conduct; it undermines the integ-
rity of the employment relationship, debilitates morale, and inter-
feres with the work productivity of an organization. Sexual harass-
ment will not be tolerated at any level. Substantiated acts of or
conduct which results in sexual harassment shall result in corrective
action.
Department of the Navy, Office of the Secretary, SECNAV INSTRUCTION
5300.26A (1989).
29. See Philip Shenon, Hearings Against Sergeant Major Conclude, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 26, 1997, at A10.
30. Stephen Komarow, Army Sex Scandal Reaches Higher, Service's Top
Enlisted Man Faces Charges, USA TODAY, May 8, 1997, at 3A.
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profile and regarded as a "he said, she said" contest in which
the six female accusers were pitted against McKinney and his
long record of distinguished military service.31 Unlike Ser-
geant Simpson, however, McKinney was not charged with rape
by constructive force. Except for one alleged incident,32 the
misconduct charged against McKinney took the form of aggres-
sive sexual harassment, including pressure for dates, forced
kissing and verbal boasting of his sexual prowess to female
subordinates. Ultimately, McKinney was acquitted of all the
sexual misconduct charges33 and found guilty only of obstruc-
tion of justice for attempting to coach the testimony of one of
his accusers. He was demoted to master sergeant and repri-
manded.34
At first blush, it is not immediately obvious just what
these charges of sexual misconduct have to do with the re-
evaluation of gender integration in basic training. There
seems to be a disconnect between the crisis and the response.
As a practical matter, it is noteworthy that Aberdeen is an ad-
vanced-not a basic-training facility and the report made no
recommendation to resegregate the sexes at this level of
training. More to the point, the report did not explain how seg-
regating the sexes into separate barracks during basic training
would prevent male instructors from exploiting female recruits,
31. See Jane Gross, Former Top Sergeant of Army Is Acquitted of All Sex
Charges, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1998, at Al; Jane Gross, When Character
Counts, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1998, at Al.
32. One woman sergeant testified that she reluctantly had sex with
McKinney when she was eight months pregnant. See Bone, supra note 27, at
20.
33. The jurors in the McKinney court-martial declined to comment on
their reasons for acquitting McKinney of the sexual misconduct charges. As
possible explanations for the acquittal, commentators have cited the heavy
burden of proof (beyond a reasonable doubt) in courts-martial and the exis-
tence of the "good soldier" defense which permits the fact finder in military
prosecutions to rely on the accused's good record to create reasonable doubt as
to the commission of each offense charged. See Editorial, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 17, 1998, at A24 (emphasizing heavy burden of proof); STEPHEN A.
SALTZBURG ET AL., MILITARY RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 458-59 (3d ed.
1991) (explaining that "good military character" is admissible in prosecutions
for "uniquely military offenses" such as prosecutions under Article 134).
34. The demotion may have the effect of reducing McKinney's lifetime
pension benefits by as much as $700,000. However, this issue will first be de-
cided through the military administrative process. See Jane Gross, Sergeant
Major Gets One-Step Demotion But No Time in Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17,
1998, at Al.
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particularly when there was no proposal that only women in-
structors train women recruits.
A clue to a possible connection between the crisis and the
response can be found in the press coverage of Aberdeen and
the other cases where charges of sexual harassment and sexual
misconduct were lodged. Not infrequently the problem of sex-
ual harassment was discussed in the press as a "woman prob-
lem," with the focus on the victim, rather than on the accused.
The press accounts often highlighted the difficulties of the
"experiment" of women in the military.35 Soon, conservative
Senators like Rick Santorum of Pennsylvania were calling for
resegregation of the sexes, declaring that the experiment with
women had failed.36
Accounts describing women in the military as an
"experiment" convey an implicit warning. The message seems
to be that complaints of sexual harassment might end up
harming the accusers not only in the individual sense of label-
ing the complainant a troublemaker or someone who brought
the misconduct on herself, but in the more systemic sense of
prompting a reexamination of the "place" of women in the in-
stitution. In this scenario, the response to what is essentially a
complaint about discriminatory working conditions takes a pu-
nitive turn, with the effect of questioning the rights of the per-
son who complains, rather than addressing the source of the
discriminatory behavior.
In the past, concerns about the sexual exploitation of
women in the workplace quite often gave rise to the "solution"
of exclusion. In the mid-nineteenth century, for example, when
women first integrated the federal civil service, there were sex
35. It was not always clear whether the "experiment" with women en-
compassed only gender integration during basic training or referred to
women's enhanced role in the military more generally. See John Barry &
Evan Thomas, At War Over Women, NEWSWEEK, May 12, 1997, at 48 ("The
headlines have made some wonder whether the integration of women into the
armed forces is a failed experiment."); Steven Lee Meyers, Defense Chief Re-
jects Advice to Separate Sexes in Training, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1998, at Al
(citing statement by Congress member that "[tihe recent experiment with so-
cial engineering has been proven a failure"); Elaine Sciolino, Sergeant Con-
victed of 18 Counts of Raping Female Subordinates, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30,
1997, at Al ("Today's verdict is certain to rekindle the debate on Capitol Hill
and within the military about whether the American military's experiment
with integrating men and women has failed.").
36. See Dana Priest, Army May Restudy Mixed-Sex Training: Chief Sug-
gests It's Time to Weigh Benefits, Drawbacks, WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 1997, at Al;
Editorial, The Military and Women, WALL ST. J., Feb. 21, 1997, at A14.
19981
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
scandals in which supervisors were charged with trying to ex-
tract sexual favors from female subordinates, what we would
today call quid pro quo harassment.37 In 1864, there were
Congressional hearings addressing the scandal and much
heated discussion by journalists and writers. Rather than
simply denouncing the actions of the harassers, however, the
debate centered on the propriety of hiring married women to
work side by side with men (who regularly engaged in "manly"
conduct at the office, such as smoking and spitting into spit-
toons).38
The exclusionary response can also be seen in the 1948
case of Goesaert v. Cleary.39 The case challenged a Michigan
statute that barred women from the job of bartender (unless
their husband or father owned the bar).40 The Michigan legis-
lation was part of a larger campaign by the male bartenders'
union to push women out of these jobs.41 The Court upheld the
exclusion as legitimate "protective" legislation,42 ruling that
Michigan could exclude women from this line of work in part to
protect them from the danger of sexual harassment.43 Since
the conduct at issue was not called sexual harassment at the
time, the Court delicately alluded to the "moral and social
problems""4 associated with women tending bar where they
would be exposed to drunk and unruly male customers.
As late as 1977, in the case of Dothard v. Rawlinson,45 the
Supreme Court upheld the exclusion of women from the posi-
tion of prison guard in an Alabama maximum security prison.
The majority asserted that because of the "jungle atmos-
phere"46 in the particular prison, there was a danger that
37. Quid pro quo harassment takes place when a supervisor or other per-
son in authority threatens harm or promises a benefit in exchange for sexual
compliance. See EEOC Guidelines on Sexual Harassment, 29 C.F.R. §
1604.11(a)(l)-(2) (1997).
38. See CINDY SONDIK ARON, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN OF THE CIVIL
SERVICE: MIDDLE-CLASS WORKERS IN VICTORIAN AMERICA 162-74 (1987).
39. 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
40. See id. at 465.
41. See BARBARA BABCOCK ET AL., SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW
144-47 (2d ed. 1996). The International Bartenders Association adopted the
following as a slogan: "Liquor alone causes enough trouble, why add women?"
Id. at 144.
42. See id. at 146.
43. See Goesaert, 335 U.S. at 466.
44 Id.
45. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
46. Id. at 334.
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women guards would be sexually assaulted by inmates. The
solution was to exclude the women, rather than redouble ef-
forts to punish the offenders or prevent the offense.
By the 1980s, however, the cause of action for sexual har-
assment in employment became firmly established.47 This de-
velopment seemed to go a long way towards delegitimating the
exclusionary response. In fact, the recognition of sexual har-
assment as an actionable harm may have been possible only
because the debate over women's right to equal access to jobs
and occupations had largely abated. The legal equality cam-
paign of the 1970s had been enormously successful in opening
up virtually every field to women.48 When women complained
of sexual harassment or other abusive working conditions, the
standard response was no longer that it was time to reexamine
whether women should be working in those jobs after all.
Stated another way, for perhaps the first time in history
women workers were given the opportunity to complain about
hostile working environments once the threat of denial of ac-
cess altogether became a far less likely response to conflict. In
this account, the relationship between equal access to jobs and
transforming working conditions is quite straightforward. The
guarantee of equal access for traditionally excluded groups
functions as a precondition for agitation for substantial
changes in the working culture.
My interest in the current controversy over gender in the
military fits into this larger picture of the relationship between
access to jobs and transformation of working cultures. In this
article I look at the interrelationship among some of the
prominent problem areas connected to gender in the military:49
47. See Martha Chamallas, Writing About Sexual Harassment: A Guide to
the Literature, 4 U.C.L.A. WOMEN'S L.J. 37, 83 (1993).
48. In particular, the courts have interpreted Title VII to give qualified
women access to jobs except in very rare cases in which employers can prove
that sex is a bona fide occupational qualification. See International Union,
UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 201 (1991) ("The BFOQ defense
is written narrowly, and this court has read it narrowly."). The strategy of
employers to exclude all "fertile" women from allegedly hazardous jobs was
successfully challenged by feminists, culminating in the Johnson Controls
case. See generally SALLY J. KENNEY, FOR WHOSE PROTECTION?: REPRO-
DUCTIVE HAZARDS AND EXCLUSIONARY POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES AND
GREAT BRITAIN (1992).
49. These are not the only issues related to gender in the military. In the
recent past, the most contentious issue was whether women should be subject
to a military draft. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (upholding the
constitutionality of male-only draft registration); JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, WHY
1998]
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namely, restrictions on women in combat; segregation of the
sexes during basic training; exclusion of gay men and lesbians;
enforcement of policies against rape and sexual harassment;
and enforcement of policies regulating consensual sex, par-
ticularly rules against adultery and fraternization. In a 1993
essay, Kathryn Abrams argued for such a connected approach
in addressing issues of gender and the military.5 0 This article
builds upon her work and other important recent scholarship
in the area-particularly Kenneth Karst's article, The Pursuit
of Manhood and the Desegregation of the Armed Forces,51 and
Madeline Morris's study on the incidence of rape and military
culture52-- all of which go beyond analysis of specific problems
to address root causes and long-term strategies for cultural
change.
II. THE GENDER PANIC
It is fair to describe the military's response to recent
charges of sexual misconduct and the ensuing sex scandals as a
"gender panic," or at least a gross overreaction to perceived
problems. The Kassebaum Baker report described an atmos-
phere of fear in the wake of Aberdeen. Perhaps the most dra-
matic illustration of the gender panic was that military train-
ers responded by instituting a "no talk, no touch" policy with
respect to female recruits.5 3 Male recruits in basic training
were told to avoid the women in their units altogether. The
Kassebaum Baker report describes how male recruits had been
"briefed at several installations that looking at a female for
more than 3 seconds constitutes sexual harassment."54 They
WE LOST THE ERA 46, 86 (1986) (discussing how opposition to drafting women
helped to defeat the ERA). As in the civilian workplace, there is currently
controversy surrounding the treatment of pregnancy in the military and the
possibility of women becoming pregnant continues to surface as a justification
for denying women full participation. See Michael J. Frevola, Damn the Tor-
pedoes, Full Speed Ahead. The Argument for Total Sex Integration in the
Armed Services, 28 CONN. L. REV. 621, 646-50 (1996). In this Article, how-
ever, I focus on those gender-related controversies that are most closely asso-
ciated with the recent gender panic.
50. Kathryn Abrams, Gender in the Military: Androcentrism and Institu-
tional Reform, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs., Autumn 1993, at 217.
51. Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of
the Armed Forces, 38 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 499 (1991).
52. Madeline Morris, By Force of Arms: Rape, War, and Military Culture,
45 DUKE L.J. 651 (1996).
53. See Advisory Report, supra note 23, at 12.
54. Id. at 16.
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were told that they should stay away from the opposite sex be-
cause they could ruin their career.5 5 What was described as a
"buddy system" was enforced when males and female recruits
interacted.56 I understand this to mean that no man was per-
mitted to interact with a woman without another woman being
present. In the rush to respond to Aberdeen, there did not
seem to be widespread appreciation that such a cure for sexual
harassment might prove worse than the disease.
* Although the advisory report did not approve of the "no
talk, no touch" policy and in fact specifically recommended that
it be eliminated, it is curious to note how the panic and its af-
termath seemed to play into the committee's bottom line view
on the desirability of segregation in basic training. For exam-
ple, the advisory report concluded that little of value would be
lost by resegregating the units. The committee conceded that
"there will be some loss of training time together between
males and females, including time spent marching together
and eating together."57 It reasoned, however, that "because
many trainers now insist their recruits refrain from talking to
the opposite sex at all times, these periods of marching and
eating together provide little in the way of meaningful integra-
tion."58 Compared to treating women as untouchables (in the
bad sense of the word), presumably segregation seemed prefer-
able.
The other evidence of the existence of a gender panic
comes from the handling of and the media frenzy surrounding
the case of Lieutenant Kelly Flinn, the first woman to pilot a
B-52 bomber. Flinn was scheduled to be court-martialed for
violating the Air Force's rule against adultery, lying to her
commander about the relationship and violating a direct order
against continuing the relationship.5 9
Flinn's gender was always at the forefront of the case. The
Air Force appeared determined to deal harshly with Flinn, to
55. See id.
56. See id. at 12; see also Diane H. Mazur, The Beginning of the End for
Women in the Military, 48 FLA. L. REV. 461, 465-66 (1996) (describing the
buddy system).
57. Advisory Report, supra note 23, at 13.
58. Id.
59. These were the main charges, stemming from Flinn's relationship
with Marc Zigo, a civilian who was married to an enlisted woman. See KELLY
FLINN, PROUD TO BE 206 (1997). There was also a charge of fraternization
lodged against Flinn, based on a "one night" encounter with an enlisted man
who was not in Flinn's chain of command. See id. at 157.
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underscore that the rules of sexual misconduct applied equally
to men and women. The Secretary of the Air Force at that
time, Sheila Widnall (the first woman to occupy the post), was
placed in the unenviable position of determining the proper
punishment under intense media scrutiny. To avoid a court-
martial, Flinn ultimately agreed to a general discharge. The
compromise kept Flinn out of jail, but the less-than-honorable
discharge meant that she lost her commission and part of her
veteran benefits.
In a recent (admittedly self-serving) memoir of the events,
Flinn speculates that it was gender panic that probably pre-
vented her case from being treated administratively, like so
many other adultery cases, in which the offending party sub-
mits to counseling, is reprimanded and pays a fine. She re-
flects:
Maybe the military brass wanted to even the score, to show that
women were every bit as capable of sexual peccadilloes as men are-a
kind of perverse equal opportunity project. Or maybe, as many
women's advocates have suggested, this was a way of saying, without
having to say it, that women have no place in the military: let them
in and all hell breaks loose.
Around the time of the Flinn case, the media began to re-
port on many cases of military personnel-men and women-
facing criminal charges of adultery and/or fraternization. 61
One particular sympathetic offender was Lieutenant William
Kite, threatened with a court-martial for having a sexual rela-
tionship with an enlisted woman, whom he later married and
who subsequently left the Air Force. The media depicted the
young couple as the victims of a heartless (and mindless) bu-
reaucracy whose only crime was to fall in love.62 The panic
may have crested when President Clinton's choice for Chair-
man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Joseph W. Ralston,
was pressured to withdraw his candidacy after it was revealed
that he had had an affair with a civilian woman more than ten
60. Id. at 213.
61. Some of these charges reached the upper ranks. For example, John
E. Longhouser, a two-star general who had been a commanding officer at Ab-
erdeen, retired early, at one rank beneath his standing, after it was revealed
that he had engaged in adultery five years earlier, at a time when he was
separated from his wife. See Editorial, Sex and the Military, WASH. POST,
June 6, 1997, at A26.
62. See Elaine Sciolino, Courtship Leads to Marriage and Maybe Officer's
Ouster, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1997, at Al.
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years before, violating the rule against adultery because he
was married at the time.63
As the panic abated somewhat, military authorities took a
more moderate position with respect to gender integration of
women in basic training. Defense Secretary Cohen decided to
reject the most controversial recommendation of the Kasse-
baum Baker advisory report and to continue gender integra-
tion in training units and in barracks in the three services
which currently integrate the sexes. 64 At the same time, how-
ever, he ordered that there should be more privacy and physi-
cal space between the sexes in actual living accommodations,
even though men and women might be housed in the same bar-
racks.65 Although considered a temporary victory for women's
rights, Cohen left open the possibility that he might decide to
resegregate the sexes in the future. Conservative members of
Congress responded to Cohen's decision by vowing to return to
segregation through the passage of legislation.66 In the mean-
time, the Marine Corps continued its policy of training men
and women separately.67
By August 1998, Defense Secretary Cohen had also taken
steps to refine the military's position with respect to adultery
and fraternization, without fundamentally changing the direc-
tion of military policy.68 Under the new proposal, adultery re-
63. See FLINN, supra note 59, at 245-46.
64. See Steven Lee Myers, Defense Chief Rejects Advice to Separate Sexes
in Training, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1998, at A4.
65. See id.
66. The House passed a bill requiring separate training and housing
throughout the military at the basic training level. The Senate rejected the
bill, deferring the decision on resegregation until after a Congressionally ap-
pointed committee issues its report. See House, Senate Differ Basic Training
of Sexes, SEATTLE TMEES, June 25, 1998, at A3.
67. See id.
68. The Department of Defense has issued a notice of proposed amend-
ments to the Manual for Courts-Martial recommending the addition of a new
"explanation" section that lists nine factors to guide commanders in making
determinations of when adulterous conduct is "prejudicial to the good order
and discipline or is of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces."
R.14.2 Notice of Proposed Amendments, 63 Fed. Reg. 43, 687 (1998). Secre-
tary Cohen also directed each of the four military services to produce similarly
worded policies and training material to prohibit sexual relations between of-
ficers and enlisted personnel and between recruiters and recruits, emphasiz-
ing the objective of standardizing anti-fraternization policies among the serv-
ices. See Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), News
Briefing (last updated July 29,1998)<http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul1998
/t07291998-tO729ascd.html>. For a more detailed discussion of the military's
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mains an offense subject to criminal penalties, although the
number of adultery cases that qualify as a violation of military
policy is very likely to decrease. With respect to fraternization,
the latest proposals would increase the scope of the ban on con-
sensual relationships within the military, prohibiting virtually
all sexual encounters between officers and enlisted personnel.
Through the ebb and flow of events, what is most striking
about these recent developments is how charges of rape and
sexual harassment are so easily lumped together with the
cases involving adultery and fraternization. At the turn of this
century, we again seem to be in the midst of an old-fashioned
"sex scandal." Both consensual and coercive sexual conduct are
discussed as if they derived from the same undifferentiated
source, namely, biological urges. This conflation obscures con-
sideration of the relative power of the parties and the vastly
differing social contexts of the incidents. Alleged rapists are
treated as if they were on the same moral plane and caused the
same type of injuries as persons who have committed adultery.
At times it seems as if the cultural changes produced by the
feminist movement of the 1970s and 1980s and the liberaliza-
tion of sexual mores occurring since the late 1960s have been
erased, leaving for analysis only the categories available in
1950s America.69 Although the public debate over the military
sex scandals is not the only controversy about which this ob-
servation could be made, it surely has influenced the military's
approach to the regulation of the private and professional life
of its personnel and its framing of ethical questions relating to
sexual conduct.
The excessive media coverage of the numerous military sex
cases has the tendency to exhaust viewers and readers. The
overall effect is to create the impression that things have gone
too far and that it is time to stop the accusations. From what I
can discern from the newspaper accounts of the adul-
tery/fraternization cases and from the memoir of Kelly Flinn,
many of the recent threats of courts-martial for consensual sex
seem unwarranted. It is probably a good thing that the tide of
public opinion now seems to be against strict enforcement of
the military's rules against adultery and fraternization.
anti-fraternization policies, see infra Part m.B.3.
69. For a discussion of the components of the sexual revolution of the
1960s through the 1980s, see STEPHANIE CoNTZ, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE:
AMERICAN FAMILIES AND THE NOSTALGIA TRAP 193-96 (1992).
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However, I fear that the media saturation and the confla-
tion of coercive and consensual sex has also generated a high
level of skepticism about the legitimacy of complaints of sexual
harassment, rape and other forms of gender bias in the mili-
tary. The advisory report on gender-integrated training, for
example, expressed concerns about the demoralization of
trainers who purportedly lived in fear of being falsely accused
of sexual misconduct. It recited the view that "bill of rights
cards, dial-a-problem phone lines, and recruit training cri-
tiques have given recruits a stronger sense of their rights than
of their responsibilities." 70 This version of the fallout from the
sex scandal at Aberdeen regards women's presence as posing a
threat to military discipline and ultimately the readiness of
troops.
From an outsider's vantage point, it is difficult to judge
whether this fear of a breakdown in discipline and a purported
shift of power from drill sergeant to female recruits is war-
ranted or is simply a backlash against the assertion of rights to
gender equality. It should be kept in mind that not every
woman who alleges sexual harassment has a good case and
that men from less privileged groups (particularly African
American men) are disproportionately targeted by accusations
of harassment and sexual misconduct.71 My point here, how-
70. Advisory Report, supra note 23, at 10.
71. Sergeant Major McKinney, Sergeant Simpson and several other Afri-
can American service members accused of sexual harassment at Aberdeen
complained of racist selective prosecution. At his court-martial, Sergeant
Major McKinney alleged that he was singled out because of his race and his
lawyer submitted a list to the court containing the names of generals who had
supposedly been allowed to retire quietly after being accused of similar sex-
related violations. See Philip Shenon, Judge is Given Names of Accused Gen-
erals, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1997, at A23. McKinney also complained that Army
investigators had asked witnesses whether McKinney was "only interested in
white women." Army Charges Top Enlisted Man with Sex-Misconduct Of-
fenses, CI. TRIB., May 8, 1997, at All. The six women who accused McKin-
ney of harassment were white.
The NAACP questioned the fairness of the Simpson court-martial, alleg-
ing that the conviction was "an attack on the leadership of the African-
American male." Sciolino, supra note 35, at Al. All of the 12 Aberdeen sol-
diers accused of sexual misconduct were black, while most of the accusers
were white. Some female soldiers stated that investigators pressured them
into accusing the black drill sergeants of rape. See First of Aberdeen Trials
Begins, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Apr. 15,1997, at 3A.
In addition to intentional racially selective enforcement, there may also
be race bias in the labeling of conduct as harassment. See Patti A. Giuffre &
Christine L. Williams, Boundary Lines: Labeling Sexual Harassment in Res-
taurants, 8 GENDER & SOC'Y 378, 387-97 (1994) (finding that target is more
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ever, is that in the year since the Aberdeen scandals first came
to light, there appears to have been a reconfiguration of the
problem-the initial focus on eliminating sexual abuse of
women recruits has shifted to a concern for re-establishing dis-
cipline and improving morale among the troops, the large ma-jority of whom, of course, are men. Particularly when the con-
troversies about consensual sex are linked to the handling of
charges of sexual harassment and exploitation, the problem of
"sex in the military" appears intractable. It is not hard to see
how the cumulation of incidents can create a longing for a sim-
pler time, a time when there were far fewer women in the
armed forces. This sets the stage for a reexamination of the
"experiment" of women in the military, with the real prospect
that women could again be subject to segregation and margi-
nalization. Before this occurs, it seems appropriate to take a
closer look at the gender panic, disentangle its various strands,
and try to construct a different logic to connect the various
gender-related controversies within the military.
I. THREE THEORETICAL FRAMES: A FEMINIST TAKE
ON THE GENDER PANIC
At its most basic, the gender panic in the military involves
the interplay of three critical elements: (military) employment,
sexual behavior, and gender. Structuring the topic this way
suggests that it is ripe for feminist analysis and that we could
learn something useful from the body of social science research
on women and organizations. To begin with, there is a rich lit-
erature investigating gender dynamics in the workplace, in-
cluding how the gender composition of a working group and the
distribution of power within an organization can affect the in-
cidence of gender bias and sexual harassment7 2 Sociologists
and legal academics have explored the special predicament of
the "token" woman, an apt characterization of the female sol-
dier who is still likely to find herself far outnumbered by men
likely to label sexualized conduct "harassment" when the perpetrator is of a
different race, ethnicity or sexual orientation).
72. For a description of the sociological literature focusing on organiza-
tional demography and power, see Robin J. Ely, The Power in Demography:
Women's Social Constructions of Gender Identity at Work, 38 AcAD. MGMT. J.
589, 589-92 (1995); see also Elizabeth Chambliss, Organizational Determi-
nants of Law Firm Integration, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 669, 679-91 (1997)(explaining structuralist and organizational theories in the sociology of work).
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within an historically male-dominated environment.73 Addi-
tionally, perhaps no topic has generated more interest among
feminist scholars than the meaning of "consent" in sexual rela-
tionships and the complexity of defining sexual harassment 74
given the differing perspectives and social positions of the par-
ties involved. Allegations that drill sergeants raped female re-
cruits without resorting to actual physical force, for example,
closely resemble feminist descriptions of sexual exploitation
and abuse of power outside the military context.
In the last decade there has also been a tremendous
growth in the volume and sophistication of writings about the
social meaning of gender. The new gaylegal scholarship"5 has
generated deeper understandings of masculinity that can help
us to dissect those aspects of military culture that operate as
formidable barriers to gender integration.
The following is a distillation of themes and insights from
social science research and feminist and gaylegal theory that
strike me as having the most obvious relevance to an analysis
of the gender panic. Although my recitation contains nothing
particularly novel or unfamiliar, these insights about the rela-
tionship among employment, sexual conduct, and gender rarely
find their way into popular accounts of the scandals. To a large
extent, the categories and vocabulary of feminism are still
quite foreign to the more mainstream discourses that dominate
discussion in the media, on Capitol Hill and within military
circles.
73. In her memoir, Kelly Flinn reflects on her experience of being a token
woman at the Air Force Academy and in her subsequent training as a bomber
pilot. Amazingly, she was given the "call sign" of "Token," which she describes
as "somebody's idea of an icebreaker." She later had it changed to "Scoper."
FLINN, supra note 59, at 153.
74. Some important new contributions focusing on the harms of sexual
harassment are Kathryn Abrams, The New Jurisprudence of Sexual Harass-
ment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1169 (1998); Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual
Harassment with Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV. 445 (1997); Katherine M.
Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691 (1997);
Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683
(1998). For a review of some of the earlier literature, see MARTHA CHA-
MiALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 236-50 (forthcoming
1999).
75. See CHAMALLAS, supra note 74, at 157-70.
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A. THE DYNAMICS OF TOKENISM
Perhaps because of the volume of media attention devoted
to women in the military, we may lose sight of the fact that
there are still, relatively speaking, not that many women in the
armed forces. Currently only about thirteen and a half percent
of service personnel are women.76 Although this represents a
dramatic increase from the two percent figure for women who
served in 1972, it is still fair to characterize women's presence
as "token" in the social science meaning of the term. In the so-
ciological literature "tokenism" is used to describe the situation
of a group that is dramatically under-represented in a given
organizational setting.7 Relative numbers are important in
this theory because of severe limitations on the extent to which
small minority groups can influence the culture of the places
where they work. 78 As long as they are still considered oddi-
ties and outsiders, members of the token group are likely to be
hampered by lack of acceptance for their individual talents.
They are often looked upon as symbols of their group and so-
cially constructed in highly predictable ways. Tokens are
rarely perceived as leaders or exemplary teammates. 79
The point at which a group gets beyond token representa-
tion to achieve a "critical mass" will differ from context to con-
text. However, the figure of twenty-five percent is most often
cited as an indication that a given group has the ability to form
alliances and coalitions and to engage in effective strategies to
76. See Advisory Report, supra note 23, at 2.
77. See CHAMALLAS, supra note 74, at 177 (discussing Rosabeth Moss
Kanter's ground-breaking work in tokenism theory). For a discussion of many
of the more recent tokenism studies, see generally Brief of NOW Legal De-
fense and Education Fund et al. in support of petitioner, Piscataway Bd. of
Educ. v. Taxman (No. 96-679), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2506 (1997), cert. dis-
missed, 118 S. Ct. 595 (1997), available in 1997 WL 523789.
78. Two basic insights of tokenism theory are that relative numbers affect
power in institutions and that relative numbers affect the culture of an insti-
tution. See Sally J. Kenney, New Research on Gendered Political Institutions,
49 POL. RESEARCH Q. 445, 456-57 (1996).
79. For a discussion of the dynamics of tokenism, see Martha Chamallas,
Structuralist and Cultural Domination Theories Meet Title VII: Some Con-
temporary Influences, 92 MICH. L. REv. 2370, 2378-85 (1994); see also Jennifer
Crocker & Kathleen McGraw, What's Good for the Goose is Not Good for the
Gander: Solo Status an Obstacle to Occupational Achievement for Males and
Females, 27 AM. BEHAV. Sci. 357, 365-66 (1984) (indicating that a laboratory
experiment found that token women were less likely to be identified as lead-
ers of the group or to perceive themselves as leaders).
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influence the culture of an organization. 80 Before this point is
reached, tokens are more vulnerable to gender bias, including
various forms of stereotyping and typecasting.8'
Tokenism theory has slowly been gaining acceptance out-
side the academy. Most significantly, the case law under Title
VII has begun to recognize the connection between tokenism
and gender discrimination. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,82
the United States Supreme Court acknowledged the link be-
tween tokenism and the prevalence of stereotyping which pre-
vented a talented woman from being made partner in a large
accounting firm. In the influential case of Robinson v. Jack-
sonville Shipyards, Inc.,83 a trial court credited the testimony
of a social psychologist who took the position that tokenism fos-
tered a virulent form of sexual harassment of blue collar
women. At the shipyards, the very presence of the token
women posed a challenge to the hyper-masculine working envi-
ronment.
As an employer of women, the military is poised to go be-
yond tokenism, at least in some of the services. What happens
in the next decade could thus have a crucial long-term impact
on women's status in the military. In 1993, for example,
women represented sixteen percent of new recruits in the
Army.84 The comparable figure for the Navy was thirteen per-
cent, twenty-two percent for the Air Force, and five percent for
the Marines. 85 Although these numbers represent an increase
over the recent past, we should not assume that the percentage
of women in the military will automatically increase simply
with the passage of time. Even more so than most employers,
80. See Diane N. Ruble & E. Tory Higgins, Effects of Group Sex Composi-
tion on Self-Presentation and Sex-Typing, 32 J. SOC. ISSUES 125, 131 (1976);
James H. Thomas & Dirk C. Prather, Integration of Females into a Previously
All-Male Institution, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTH SYMPOSIUM ON PSY-
CHOLOGY IN THE AIR FORCE 100-01 (1976); cf Eve Spangler et al., Token
Women: An Empirical Test of Kanter's Hypothesis, 84 Am. J. SOC. 160 (1978)
(observing that the performance of women law students was better in law
schools with 33% female enrollment as compared to law schools with only 20%
female enrollment).
81. See Brief of NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund et al., supra
note 77, at 19 (arguing that "tokenism thus contributes to the vicious circle of
stereotyping- stereotyping supports the glass ceiling, and the glass ceiling re-
inforces gender stereotypes").
82. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
83. 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
84. See Morris, supra note 52, at 742 n.346.
85. See id.
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the military makes deliberate decisions about how many
women it intends to recruit.86 The representation of women
thus depends not only on market forces and women's prefer-
ences, but on defined military policy. Most importantly, each
service has a policy on "accessions" for female and male re-
cruits, setting numerical goals for the sexes in the upcoming
year. Madeline Morris reports, for example, that the Army's
goal for women recruits in 1994 was eighteen percent, com-
pared to sixteen percent for the Marines,87 and between eight-
een and twenty percent for the Navy.88
Although there is no longer a fixed, static ceiling set on the
number of women in the military,8 9 women's representation is
carefully monitored and managed. This means that a changing
political climate can have a significant (even if not highly visi-
ble) impact on women's presence in the military. Contempo-
rary writers are now beginning to discuss the effects of the
policy known as "womanpause" instituted shortly after Presi-
dent Ronald Reagan took office. The objective of the 1981-82
policy was to diminish the visible presence of women, including
an announced reduction in "accessions" for female Army re-
cruits.90 The current gender panic comes at a time when the
Clinton administration has been quietly working to reverse
some of the components of womanpause, notably by raising
numerical goals for the recruitment of women.
The low representation of women in the armed forces
makes a considerable difference in the everyday life of soldiers.
It manifests itself first in basic training. The advisory report
was quick to put the issue of gender-integrated training "in
perspective" by noting that at the present time, despite public
perception, only a minority of male recruits routinely train
86. See id. at 739-40.
87. See id. at 740.
88. Morris was not able to cite a figure for the Air Force. In contrast to
the Army and the Marines, the accessions policies of the Navy and the Air
Force are now expressed only in "gender neutral" figures. These two services,
however, still make projections or predictions of the number and percentage
of women expected to be recruited. See id.
89. Until 1967, there were statutory ceilings restricting women to only 2%
of the total enlisted population. See id. at 734.
90. See Karst, supra note 51, at 524 n.96. In 1982, the Army also reseg-
regated basic training which had been integrated in 1978 and added to the list
of occupational specialties that were designated as "combat" jobs from which
women were excluded. See id.
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with women in basic training.91 The advisory report stated
that "approximately 50 percent of the Army's male recruits, 25
percent of the Navy's male recruits, and 40 percent of the Air
Force's male recruits regularly train with women."92 Except for
the Marines, this is not a result of a restrictive formal policy,
but stems solely from the fact that there are not enough women
to integrate every unit, particularly if the service decides to
cluster women recruits rather than widely disperse them on a
random basis.93
Social scientists studying civilian workplaces have
stressed that the existence and effects of tokenism must also be
assessed at the level of the working group, i.e., the group of in-
dividuals who have face-to-face daily interaction. 94 Even when
the overall representation of women in a large organization in-
creases, it may have little effect on the personal interactions of
the workers if the women are so dispersed that their presence
has little chance to affect the culture of the working group.
The relative number of women in the military is important un-
der tokenism theory, not primarily because it represents the
number of "opportunities" available to women, but because it is
a proxy for determining the "male" or "gender-integrated"
character of the working environment.
Advocates for gender-integrated training have asserted
that there is an inverse relationship between the level of gen-
der-integration and the level of sexual harassment. Citing a
1996 Report by the Department of Defense, the Co-President of
the National Women's Law Center noted that the Marine
Corps-the service with the lowest representation of women
and the only service which segregates the sexes during basic
training-had the highest level of reported sexual harass-
ment.95 Conversely, the service which had integrated basic
training to the largest extent, the Navy, had also been the most
successful in reducing the reported incidence of sexual miscon-
duct.96
Tokenism theory thus directly contradicts the traditional
view that separating the sexes is a cure for sexual harassment.
Because tokenism theory starts from the premise that the
91. Advisory Report, supra note 23, at 3.
92. Id.
93. See Morris, supra note 52, at 742-43.
94. See generally Ruble & Higgins, supra note 80.
95. See Statement of Nancy Duff Campbell, supra note 24, at 6.
96. See id.
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character of the working culture affects the way people behave
and interact, it posits that changing the demographics of a
group may be the surest way to change the culture, and ulti-
mately the behavior of the majority in the group. It also rejects
the more biologically-premised view that men will inevitably be
tempted to abuse women, unless their access to women is re-
stricted.97 For feminists, tokenism theory offers the promise of
integration and equal access, without having to endure har-
assment and sexual abuse as the price of admission.
Another aspect of tokenism theory that seems particularly
relevant to the current gender panic is its focus on the gender
composition of the group that makes decisions. In examining
the informal structures of an organization, sociologists have
looked to see who exercises power, in particular whether any
(and how many) of the token group are also located in supervi-
sory or leadership positions.98 We have long gotten past the
point of thinking that the appointment of a Madeleine Albright
or a Janet Reno or some other woman "first" will miraculously
change the status of women within the organizations they
head. Nevertheless, there does seem to be a positive correla-
97. The biological approach is prevalent in the popular press. Many
commentators, for example, expressed the view that the sex scandals at Aber-
deen were the inevitable, natural result of placing male soldiers in close
proximity to female soldiers. See, e.g., Thomas J. Bray, Aberdeen: A Result of
Utopianism, DET. NEWS, May 4, 1997, at C6 (stating that "[n]o amount of sen-
sitivity training is going to overcome the hormonal inclinations of military-age
males and females"); Richard Cohen, Duty, Gender, Country, WASH. POST,
Apr. 24, 1997, at A25 (noting that "it's also possible that the scandal is a
warning to both the brass and the civilian leadership that they are attempting
the impossible-a fight not against a few bad men but against a more formi-
dable foe: human nature").
98. To reduce stereotyping, the social science research indicates that
there must be substantial gender integration in supervisory positions. It is
not enough that women are proportionately represented among the rank and
file. See Ely, supra note 72, at 625-27; cf. Cecilia L. Ridgeway, Gender Differ-
ences in Task Groups: A Status and Legitimacy Account, in STATUS GEN-
ERALIZATION: NEW THEORY AND RESEARCH 188, 195-98 (1988) (theorizing that
the gender of the "organizational authority structure" affects participation of
women in both mixed-sex and single-sex groups); Madeline E. Heilman &
Richard F. Martell, Exposure to Successful Women: Antidote to Sex Discrimi-
nation in Applicant Screening Decisions?, 37 ORG. BEHAv. & HUM. DECISION
PROCESSES 376, 378 (1986) (suggesting that exposure to successful women can
sometimes mitigate against broader gender stereotyping); Madeline E. Hell-
man, Sex Stereotypes and Their Effects in the Workplace: What We Know and
What We Don't Know, 10 J. SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 1, 10-11 (1995)
(emphasizing that the referent for women managers is limited to the propor-
tion of women in similar roles).
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tion between the representation of women in leadership posi-
tions and prospects for integrating greater numbers of women
into the organization. Some women leaders do bring new per-
spectives into their decisionmaking and may be more likely to
detect subtle, but harmful, forms of gender bias. Female lead-
ers can also serve as role models for both males and females
under their supervision.99 Theorists have also noted that as
more women are promoted to leadership roles, their authority
seems more "natural.' 00
In the civilian workplace, informal barriers pose the great-
est obstacle to the advancement of women within organiza-
tional hierarchies. In the military, it is a formal barrier-the
exclusion of women from combat positions-that is recognized
as the single, major impediment to women's ascent into com-
mand positions.' 0I A number of commentators have detailed
the ways in which the combat exclusion curtails opportunities
for military women: not only are they barred from engaging in
actual ground combat, but they are often excluded from occu-
pational specialties, simply because some personnel in this line
of work might be expected to serve in combat conditions. 102
Perhaps most importantly, the combat exclusion plays a sym-
bolic or expressive role. As long as it is in place, the prototype
of the soldier remains the male hand-to-hand combatant, rein-
forcing the view that "to be a 'real soldier,' a fighter, one must
be a man."103
It is instructive to note that even in the Israeli armed
forces, where women comprise nearly half of all military per-
sonnel, 104 their exclusion from combat roles has served to di-
99. For women in the lower ranks, the presence of female officers may
have the effect of increasing their level of ambition and self confidence.
Studies show that women are reluctant to seek jobs that few other women
have held. See Laurie L. Cohen & Janet K. Swim, The Differential Impact of
Gender Ratios on Women and Men: Tokenism, Self Confidence, and Expecta-
tions, 21 PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. BuLL. 876, 883 (1995); cf Christine
L. Williams, GENDER DIFFERENCES AT WORK: MEN AND WOMEN IN NON-
TRADITIONAL JOBS (1989) (arguing that women were initially attracted to the
Marine Corps because of active efforts to recruit them). For both men and
women, the research indicates that stereotyping decreases in more gender di-
verse environments. See Anne Locksley et al., Sex Stereotypes and Social
Judgment, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 821, 830 (1980).
100. See Karst, supra note 51, at 527 n.108.
101. See id. at 524 n.95.
102. See id. at n.96.
103. Morris, supra note 52, at 738.
104. Since the founding of Israel in 1948, there has been a compulsory
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minish their power within the military. One irony is that
women's greater participation in combat during the struggle
for statehood in Israel 05 neither ensured that women would
continue to be allowed to engage in combat,106 nor did it trans-
form military culture. 0 7 Instead, like their American counter-
parts, women in the Israeli military are often assigned to cleri-
cal positions108 and expensive training is primarily invested in
men rather than women. 109 The problem of sexual harassment
has also surfaced in the Israeli military and has recently been
linked to women's lack of advancement and status. 110
Without repeating the arguments for and against permit-
ting women to occupy combat positions,"' I wish to underscore,
as a way of shedding light on the causes of the gender panic,
that the military is at a critical juncture with respect to the
combat exclusion. Since 1991, there has been a significant
military draft for both sexes. An estimated one-half of the 176,000 regular
forces are women. See Andy Goldberg, Sex Video Exposes Torment of Israel's
Women Soldiers, SUNDAY TIMES, Apr. 23, 1995. However, women have
shorter enlistment periods than men (21 months versus 36 months). See Sa-
sha Sadan, Women Battle IDF Job Discrimination, JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 11,
1994, at 4B, available in 1994 WL 9848666.
105. For a discussion of women's heroic participation in combat during the
pre-state period, see Anne R. Bloom, Israel: The Longest War, in FEMALE
SOLDIERS-COMBATANTS OR NONCOMBATANTS? 137, 137-62 (Nancy Loring
Goldman ed., 1982).
106. Women were soon excluded from combat after the 1948 Arab-Israeli
war. In particular, fears were raised that women combatants would be taken
prisoner, raped and brutalized by Arab soldiers, who would be humiliated be-
cause they were forced to fight against women. See Joel Greenberg, Ruling
Expands Women's Roles in the Israeli Military, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 1996, at
AS.
107. Many commentators attribute women's inferior status in the Israeli
army to the widespread acceptance of traditional attitudes about the role of
women in the larger society. See, e.g., id. (observing that "a far deeper influ-
ence on subsequent policy has been the more general paternalism toward
women in Israeli society").
108. See Ann LoLordo, Israeli Army's "Girl Stigma", BALTIMORE SUN,
Dec. 1, 1996, at LA; see also Greenberg, supra note 106, at A5 ("[Wiomen are
present, but only in roles where they are witness to the glory of men. They
are help-mates. Women serve the men, and the men serve the army.").
109. See Sadan, supra note 104, at 4B.
110. One infamous harassment case involved an allegation by a female
soldier (a 20-year old Russian immigrant) that her commander persuaded an-
other soldier to seduce her, to videotape the encounter, and to circulate the
tape among the men. See Louise Lief, Second Class in the Israeli Military;
Women Are Fighting for Equality in the Ranks, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
May 22, 1995, at 47.
111. For an argument in favor of lifting nearly all restrictions on women in
combat, see Frevola, supra note 49, at 621.
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narrowing of the combat exclusions. Women have recently
been allowed to serve on combat aircraft and combatant Navy
vessels. During the Clinton administration, the Army and the
Marine Corps also reinterpreted their definitions of combat po-
sitions to open up significantly more jobs to women. Madeline
Morris reports the stunning figure that over ninety-nine per-
cent of Air Force positions are now open to women. The com-
parable figure for the Navy is ninety-four percent. The Army,
at sixty-seven percent, and the Marine Corps, at sixty-two per-
cent, now remain as the two services which continue to bar
women from a sizable number of jobs, although even here the
formal exclusion has narrowed considerably in the last few
years.'12 The last remaining barrier to women's full participa-
tion in the military is the exclusion of women from positions
designated as "direct ground combat."
Similar to the policies on recruitment of women, the com-
bat restrictions are very much influenced by the political cli-
mate. Even though a larger number of jobs are now formally
open to women, women do not yet occupy these former-combat
posts in great numbers.113 Instead, the degree of women's ac-
cess to military positions is still very much up for grabs and
subject to debate. Recent experience demonstrates that the
definition of combat is malleable and there is no guarantee
that the combat exclusion will continue to erode. During
"womanpause," for example, the Reagan administration lim-
ited women's access by increasing the list of combat posi-
tions.114 The next few years may well prove critical, as military
authorities and Congress decide whether to step up the process
of integrating former combat positions. What does remain con-
stant is that the combat exclusion continues to function quite
effectively, albeit complexly, to depress women's chances for
promotion 1 5 and makes it less likely that women can use their
"power from within" to change military culture.
112. See Morris, supra note 52, at 736-37.
113. For example, of the 20,000 former-combat positions recently "opened"
to women in the Army, only 1,367 are currently held by women. The Catch-22
is that, in some "high-profile operations" jobs, commanders exercise their dis-
cretion to exclude women who do not have the requisite company- or battal-
ion-level experience, which the women were barred from attaining because of
the former combat exclusions. See Dana Priest, Still Far From the Front
Lines, WASH. POST NATL WKLY. ED., Jan. 26,1998, at 6.
114. See Karst, supra note 51, at 524 n.96.
115. Mid-grade female officers and senior enlisted women in the Army still
lag behind male peers in promotions. See Priest, supra note 113, at 7.
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Overall, the most significant insight to import from token-
ism theory into the military context is its questioning of the
impulse to segregate or exclude women as a long-term strategy
to cut down on the incidence of sexual harassment. The re-
search on women and organizations suggests that coercive be-
havior such as sexual harassment has a structural as well as a
moral dimension. Tokenism theory points to the gender demo-
graphics and distribution of power within an organization for
keys to understanding how an organization is likely to respond
to sexual harassment and how a change in relative numbers of
men and women can bring about a change in the working envi-
ronment. Under this analysis, more thorough integration of
women into all aspects of military life, including positions
designated as combat positions, would appear to be the best re-
sponse to Aberdeen.
B. REDEFINITIONS OF CONSENT
The conceptual frame that unites the recent scandals in
the military is that they all are tied to sex. In one sense, of
course, this is unremarkable. Because the conduct that gave
rise to the high profile cases most often involved prohibited
sexual intercourse, it is not surprising that the furor over the
incidents is referred to as a "sex scandal." However, even la-
beling the controversy in this way is quite telling and presup-
poses that the problem is really about sex, rather than, for ex-
ample, about the abuse of power, the military's policies on
women, or the social construction of gender. The label of "ex"
masks a significant, ongoing debate between traditionalist and
feminist cultural forces over where to draw the line between
permissible, private sexual conduct on the one hand, and im-
permissible sexual exploitation on the other.
Currently, the military's prohibitions on sexual conduct
are a strange amalgam of traditional and feminist viewpoints.
The military's rules against adultery, for example, seem to
emanate from an earlier era when marriage was regarded as
the sole demarcation line separating legitimate from illicit sex.
These traditionalist prohibitions contrast with the military's
definition of "constructive force" used in rape prosecutions, that
finds philosophical support in contemporary feminist concep-
tions of "consent" and "coercion." Finally, the various anti-
fraternization rules prohibiting consensual sex under a variety
of circumstances have differed so greatly among the services
that it is impossible yet to link them to any specific viewpoint
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or to trace a logic-traditionalist, feminist, or otherwise-
behind their enforcement.
1. Adultery
Rules against adultery are invariably supported by tradi-
tional notions of sexual morality. Under the traditional view of
sex, it is the marital status of the participants, rather than
their actual consent, that determines whether the conduct is
subject to legal sanctions.116 Until the late 1960s, non-marital
sex was quite uniformly discouraged-adultery was criminal-
ized in most states 17 and there was an elaborate array of indi-
rect civil sanctions that bolstered the moral ban on non-marital
sex. These included a denial of contraceptives to unmarried
persons,1 8  stigmatization and discrimination against
"illegitimate" children" 9 and a fault-based divorce system
which penalized the unfaithful spouse.120 Most importantly,
persons who committed adultery were liable to be branded as
immoral and untrustworthy, particularly if their conduct was
indiscreet. In this traditionalist view, employers operating un-
der an "at will" system of employment often chose to terminate
employees whose moral character had been called into ques-
tion.
In the civilian world, the consensus as to the proper re-
sponse to adultery began to break down with the emergence of
a more liberal attitude toward sex that marked legal reforms in
the 1970s. Consent gradually replaced marriage as the touch-
stone for determining lawful versus unlawful sex, prompting
the lifting of legal discriminations against "non-marital" chil-
dren,121 the trend towards decriminalization of consensual het-
116. See Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality and the Legal Control of
Sexual Conduct, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 781, 784-90 (1988).
117. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6 note on adultery and fornication
(Proposed Official Draft 1962).
118. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454-55 (1972) (striking
down a Massachusetts law forbidding distribution of contraception to unmar-
ried persons).
119. See generally Harry D. Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate,
65 MICH. L. REV. 477 (1967).
120. See HOMER CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES § 14.5, at 445-46 (1968) (description of traditional divorce law);
LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 6-14 (1985) (same).
121. The trend began with Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968)
(unconstitutional to deny a nonmarital child the right to recover for parent's
wrongful death), followed by Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S.
164, 176 (1972) (unconstitutional to deny nonmarital child the right to recover
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erosexual sex122 and the shift to no-fault divorce. 123 In the
world of work, employers were far more likely to respect a zone
of privacy for their employees. Although policies continued to
vary widely among employers,124 a norm emerged in which em-
ployers were generally expected to demonstrate a nexus be-
tween private sexual conduct and job performance before justi-
fying dismissal on grounds of immorality. At the present time,
an employee who carries on an adulterous relationship with
someone other than a co-worker is unlikely to be fired for that
reason alone, absent some concrete showing of deterioration in
job performance. 125
worker's compensation for father's death).
122. However, the trend is not complete. Criminal laws against adultery
are still on the books in almost half the states and are occasionally enforced.
See Note, Constitutional Barriers to Civil and Criminal Restrictions on Pre-
and Extramarital Sex, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1660, 1672-74 (1991). Selective en-
forcement is a danger and prosecutors may resort to adultery charges when
they lack evidence to prove other misconduct. For example, persons sus-
pected of prostitution or rape are sometimes charged with adultery. See id. at
1672 n.89. With respect to same-sex sexual relationships, moreover, consent
of the parties provides no assurance of legality. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (authorizing states to continue to criminalize same-sex
relationships through enforcement of anti-sodomy laws).
123. Some states, however, continue to deny alimony to a spouse who has
committed adultery. See Note, supra note 122, at 1672.
124. For example, until quite recently, Wal-Mart Stores had a policy of
prohibiting dating relationships between a married employee and another
employee, other than his or her spouse. See State v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
621 N.Y.S.2d 158, 159 (1995); see also City of Sherman v. Henry, 928 S.W.2d
464, 474 (Tex. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 1098 (1997) (upholding unwritten
police policy of not promoting anyone who had an affair with the spouse of a
fellow officer).
125. It should be emphasized, however, that both public and private em-
ployers probably have a legal right to terminate employees because they
committed adultery. Public employees have generally been unsuccessful in
challenging such dismissals on "right to privacy" grounds. See Henry, 928
S.W.2d at 474; Krzyzewki v. Metropolitan Gov't, 584 F.2d 802, 806-07 (6th
Cir. 1978); Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 436 F. Supp. 1328, 1334
(W.D. Pa. 1977), affd, 578 F.2d 1374 (3d Cir. 1978); Johnson v. San Jacinto Jr.
College, 498 F. Supp. 555, 576 (S.D. Tex. 1980). But see Briggs v. North Mus-
kegon Police Dep't, 563 F. Supp. 585, 592 (W.D. Mich. 1983), affd, 746 F.2d
1475 (6th Cir. 1984) (holding that firing married employee for engaging in
adultery violated right to privacy).
In the private sector, there is generally no redress for employees fired for
adultery, unless perhaps there is sex discrimination in the enforcement of the
ban or the employer's action amounts to an invasion of privacy which violates
public policy. See Staats v. Ohio Natl Life Ins. Co., 620 F. Supp. 118, 120
(W.D. Pa. 1985) (holding that employer did not violate public policy by dis-
charging employee who appeared at a convention with a woman who was not
his wife); Watkins v. United Parcel Serv., 797 F. Supp. 1349, 1362 (S.D.
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The military rules with respect to adultery are more puni-
tive than in the civilian world. In contrast to the decriminali-
zation of adultery under most state laws, commission of the of-
fense of adultery in violation of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice ("LCMJ") can subject a soldier to court-martial and
imprisonment. Even though relatively few persons in the mili-
tary are actually prosecuted for adultery, 126 the threat of a
court-martial is nevertheless present,127 putting pressure on
soldiers to accept less-than-honorable discharges from the
service and heightening the dangers associated with selective
enforcement.
The current standards for determining when an act of
adultery is prohibited are unclear and do not consistently re-
quire a showing either that the sexual conduct has interfered
with the service member's ability to perform his or her job or
has produced a tangible negative impact on the military unit.
Technically, the commission of adultery is insufficient to con-
stitute an offense under Article 134 of the UCMJ, unless it is
also shown that the conduct of the accused "was either prejudi-
cial to good order and discipline in the armed forces or was of a
Miss.), affd, 979 F.2d 1535 (5th Cir. 1992). But see Morriss v. Coleman Co.,
738 P.2d 841, 851 (Kan. 1987) (holding that discharge of male and female em-
ployee for taking trip together violated implied contract to treat employees
fairly). An unusual case is Slohoda v. United Parcel Serv., 475 A.2d 618, 620
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984), holding that a married employee terminated
for having an affair can show violation of state law forbidding discrimination
on the basis of marital status if employer would not have fired an unmarried
employee in a similar situation. But see Federal Rural Elec. Ins. Co. v.
Kessler, 388 N.W.2d 553, 565 (Wis. 1986) (rejecting similar claim of discrimi-
nation based on marital status).
126. See Letter from National Women's Law Center to Judith Miller, Gen-
eral Counsel, Department of Defense, at 3 n.1 (Aug. 1, 1997) (on file with
author) (stating that relatively few persons are prosecuted for adultery and
citing July 16, 1997 memorandum to Air Force commanders urging that court-
martial be sought only in "the most aggravated cases"). In particular, visits
by married military men to prostitutes seem to be tolerated and apparently
are quite common when troops are stationed outside the United States or
near the Mexican border. See Ian Fisher, Army's Adultery Rule Is Don't Get
Caught, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1997, at Al (explaining that no adultery cases
stemmed from visits to brothels in Juarez, Mexico, despite common practice of
Fort Bliss soldiers visiting prostitutes); CYNTHIA ENLOE, DOES KHAKI BECOME
You? THE MILITARIZATION OF WOMEN'S LIVES 18-45 (1983) (discussing the
military's direct and indirect control of prostitution near military bases).
127. For example, Air Force prosecutions for adultery rose to 67 in 1996,
compared to only 16 in 1987. See Elaine Sciolono, From a Love Affair to a
Court-Martial, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1997, at Al.
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nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces."128 However,
the "prejudice" and "discrediting" standards are inherently
vague and invite speculation about the possible impact of the
conduct on such intangibles as reputation and morale.
Whether adultery will be judged unlawful may depend on
whether the general public, or other soldiers, know about the
extramarital relationship and whether the fact finder is willing
to presume harmful effects from this kind of "immoral" con-
duct. In one 1994 case, 129 for example, a military court upheld
the imposition of criminal penalties against a married officer
(currently separated from his wife) who had sex in the barracks
with a civilian woman. 130 The court found the requisite harm
in the tendency for such conduct "to reduce the other soldiers'
confidence in his integrity, leadership, and respect for law and
authority... [and] to cause the other soldiers to be less likely
to conform their conduct to the rigors of military discipline."131
Most recently, the Department of Defense has issued a
proposal to refine what is meant by the "prejudice" and
"discrediting" requirements and to offer guidance to command-
ers when they are called upon to judge whether a service mem-
ber's commission of adultery constitutes an offense under mili-
tary law. The proposed "explanation" section to the Manual for
Courts-Martial states that in general only "open and notorious"
conduct will be regarded as discrediting to the service. 132 If a
service member commits adultery in a "private and discreet"
fashion, however, he or she may still be subject to sanctions if
the conduct is found to be "prejudicial."133 In deciding whether
128. United States v. Perez, 33 M.J. 1050, 1054 (1991) (no per se rule that
every act of adultery violates Article 134).
129. See United States v. Green, 39 M.J. 606 (1994).
130. See id. at 607-10.
131. Id. at 610.
132. The explanation states that:
Adultery may also be service discrediting, even though the conduct is
only indirectly or remotely prejudicial to good order and discipline.
Discredit means to injure the reputation of the armed forces and in-
cludes adulterous conduct that has a tendency, because of its open
and notorious nature, to bring the service into disrepute, make it
subject to public ridicule, or which lowers it in the public esteem.
Notice of Proposed Amendment to the Manual for Courts-Martial, 63 Fed Reg.
43,687 (1998).
133. The explanation states that "[wihile adulterous conduct that is pri-
vate and discreet in nature may not be service discrediting by this standard,
under the circumstances it may be determined to be conduct prejudicial to
good order and discipline." Id. On a general level, the explanation provides
that "f[aldulterous conduct that is directly prejudicial includes conduct that
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the commission of adultery is "prejudicial" in violation of Arti-
cle 134, commanders are directed to consider the status of the
parties, including the military status of the "co-actor" and the
accused's spouse.134 The commander should also take into ac-
count the timing of the adulterous conduct ("ongoing or recent"
versus "remote in time") and whether the accused or co-actor
was legally separated. Most importantly, commanders are told
to consider the "impact" of the adulterous conduct, specifically
whether the conduct has affected the ability of any person to
perform military duties or has had a "detrimental effect on unit
or organization morale, teamwork, and efficiency."
Particularly because the proposal would not limit a com-
mander's discretion to consider all relevant circumstances, in-
cluding those factors not specifically listed, it does not repre-
sent a dramatic change from the current policy. Adultery is
still regarded as "clearly unacceptable conduct.., that reflects
adversely on the service record of the military member."135 It
also appears to be the case that general concerns about
"reputation" may still be enough to justify penalizing adulter-
has an immediate, obvious and measurably divisive effect on unit or organiza-
tion discipline, morale or cohesion, or is clearly detrimental to the authority or
stature of or respect toward a servicemember." Id.
134. To determine whether the adultery is "prejudicial" or "discrediting"
commanders are directed to consider the following nine factors:
(a) The accused's marital status, military rank, grade or position;
(b) The co-actor's marital status, military rank, grade or position,
or relationship to the armed forces;
(c) The military status of the accused's spouse or the spouse of
co-actor, or their relationship to the armed forces;
(d) The impact, if any, of the adulterous relationship on the abil-
ity of the accused, the co-actor, or the spouse of either to perform
their duties in support of the armed forces;
(e) The misuse, if any, of government time and resources to fa-
cilitate the commission of the conduct;
(W Whether the conduct persisted despite counseling or orders to
desist; the flagrancy of the conduct, such as whether any notoriety
ensued; and whether the adulterous act was accompanied by other
violations of the UCMJ;
(g) The negative impact of the conduct on the units or organiza-
tions of the accused, the co-actor or the spouse of either of them, such
as a detrimental effect on unit or organization morale, teamwork,
and efficiency,
(h) Whether the married accused or co-actor was legally sepa-
rated; and
Ci) Whether the adulterous misconduct involves an ongoing or re-
cent relationship or is remote in time.
Id.
135. Id.
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ous conduct if the parties do not take care to hide their rela-
tionship. However, the new advice given to commanders sug-
gests that they should be hesitant to presume a negative im-
pact on morale or discipline simply from the fact of adultery.
The policy guidance encourages decision makers to assess con-
crete effects and to make contextual judgments that turn on
the facts of the individual case. Overall, the new policy guid-
ance directs commanders to consider the environmental effects
of an accused's actions but retains the basic framework that
condemns adultery as an inherently immoral act.
Even with the new proposed refinements, the military
prohibitions on adultery depend on traditional notions of mo-
rality that no longer govern employment policies in the rest of
society. Underlying the military policy of criminalization of
adultery seems to be a presumption that adultery is a sign of
bad character and that soldiers must be of good character to
serve their country well. I think it is fair to say that a more
agnostic view of adultery now permeates non-military life, al-
though certainly many people retain traditionalist beliefs.
There is no longer a consensus that people who have extra-
marital relationships are invariably of bad character or that
only people who make good choices in matters of sexual moral-
ity will perform their jobs well.136 At a time when the Presi-
dent is embroiled in a sex scandal involving adultery, I find it
surprising that there is relatively little substantive discussion
of whether adultery is always immoral and unethical or
whether adulterous conduct truly has a bearing on a person's
"fitness" to hold office.
The unwillingness to regard commission of adultery as a
proxy for bad moral character, however, does not mean that
there is a consensus that adultery is harmless or that it has no
victims. Instead, the evolution of the law outside the military
probably supports the viewpoint that the harms of adultery
should not be redressed by law, particularly by criminal-like
sanctions aimed at punishing the adulterer. While adultery is
harmful conduct, I contend that it has outlived its usefulness
as a legal category.
At the outset, I recognize that many persons regard adul-
tery as a betrayal of a spouse's trust. Couples often agree, ei-
136. See Deborah L. Rhode, In Matters Sexual, Equality Still Hasn't Made
It, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 23, 1998, at A19 ("Whatever else is true about marital fi-
delity, it is not necessarily connected to honesty in office. Consider, for exam-
ple, Richard Nixon.").
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ther explicitly or implicitly, that they will not have intimate
sexual relations with anyone else. In the eyes of many persons,
the breach of such an important promise is a deception that
clearly qualifies as a "wrong." However, we also know that
some couples make no promises of sexual fidelity
137 to each
other and that some may not regard sexual fidelity as critically
important, even if there is such a promise. The diversity of
commitments among couples makes condemnation of adultery
under all circumstances seem inappropriate. We would not, for
example, want to imprison or fine a person who entered into an
extramarital sexual relationship with the knowledge and con-
sent of his or her spouse. Because the harm of deceit is not
present in every case, it provides no contemporary justification
for criminal penalties. The traditional moral and legal code
that gave the husband exclusive sexual access to his wife,
138 re-
gardless of her wishes or the couple's private understanding,
has been altered by the more liberal currents of the last three
decades.
Similarly, it cannot be denied that adultery may give rise
to serious relational harms, whether or not accompanied by de-
ceit. The knowledge that a spouse had an intimate relation-
ship with another may alter or destroy the quality of the mar-
riage relationship, perhaps permanently. In addition to the
emotional suffering of the "betrayed" spouse, 139 the couple may
find that their everyday life has changed, that the adultery has
resulted in a "loss of spousal consortium." 40 At common law,
137. The term "sexual fidelity" may be somewhat anachronistic because it
implies that the sole meaning of faithfulness in a marriage is to refrain from
extramarital sex. This erroneously assumes that a spouse is always unfaith-
ful if he or she has sex with someone else, regardless of the couple's under-
standings and disclosures.
138. For example, the theory behind the marital rape exemption was that,
simply by virtue of marrying, women gave up their right to withhold consent
to sex. Many states have now abolished or narrowed the marital rape exemp-
tion. See KATHARINE A. BARTLETT, GENDER AND LAW 521-22 (1993). The rec-
ognition of marital rape as a crime restricts the husband's sexual access to his
wife, requiring that he first secure her consent, similar to other sexual part-
ners. See generally Robin West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape, and the
Promise of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 FLA. L. REV. 45 (1990) (arguing
that marital rape exemptions violate the Fourteenth Amendment).
139. I use the term "betrayed" spouse here to denote the spouse who did
not commit adultery, recognizing that there may be no betrayal if there was
no deception or no prior commitment of sexual fidelity. Our language has no
neutral term for such a spouse-certainly "cuckold" is not the word I am
searching for.
140. The claim for loss of spousal consortium typically centers on a loss of
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these relational harms could be vindicated in a tort action for
criminal conversation or alienation of affections brought by the
betrayed spouse against the lover of the adulterous spouse.141
The vast majority of states, however, no longer permit such
tort claims,142 even though we continue to acknowledge the
relational harm produced by adultery. This evolution has
taken place, I believe, because the law no longer presumes that
the "other woman" should be held legally responsible for
breaking up the marriage or that the "other man" stole the
plaintiffs wife away. Instead, we tend to locate the damage in-
ternally, to place responsibility on the couple to repair their
own relationship, recognizing that, in the end, each individual
has some choice over how he or she will respond to the other
person in the marriage. This more privatized way of looking at
the marriage relationship, even in the context of civil suits,
underscores the rationale for decriminalization of adultery,
particularly the decision not to impose criminal penalties on
third parties who interfere with an existing marriage by hav-
ing a sexual relationship with a married person.
In addition to the harms of deceit and loss of consortium
mentioned above, adultery is sometimes said to cause a digni-
tary or psychological injury to the "betrayed" spouse, of a spe-
cifically gendered sort. Some men describe their response to
their wife's adultery-particularly their realization that an-
other man has "captured" their wife-as a wound to their
manly pride and a disgrace that reflects on the man's
"weakness and inadequacy.'14 In this scenario, men experi-
society and companionship, as well as deterioration in the quality of sexual
relationship. In an earlier era, consortium claims also encompassed material
services (typically household services) that the wife performed for the hus-
band. See Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures in
Tort Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 463, 527 (1998); Katharine Silbaugh, Turning
Labor Into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 41-44 (1996);
Kevin Lindsay, Note, A More Equitable Approach to Loss of Spousal Consor-
tium, 75 IOWA L. REV. 713, 713-17 (1990).
141. See Jeremy D. Weinstein, Note, Adultery, Law and the State: A His-
tory, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 195, 218 (1986) (discussing the tort of criminal conver-
sation).
142. In the 1930s, there was a movement to abolish the so-called "Heart
Balm" tort claims, i.e., intentional tort claims relating to sexual and intimate
relationships, including seduction, breach of a promise to marry and criminal
conversation. See Note, Heartbalm Statutes and Deceit Actions, 83 MICH. L.
REV. 1770, 1770-73 (1985).
143. See DAVID M. Buss, THE EVOLUTION OF DESIRE: STRATEGIES OF
HUMAN MATING 126 (1994) (claiming that a wife's adultery reduces status and
reputation of husband); ANNETTE LAWSON, ADULTERY: AN ANALYSIS OF LOVE
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ence adultery as a kind of emasculation. Thus even if their
spouse remains loving and affectionate toward them, the adul-
tery might incite feelings of rage and humiliation, directed
primarily toward the "other man," for winning the competition
for sexual access to the woman.
As for women who have been betrayed by their husbands,
the gendered script-if indeed there is one-reads quite differ-
ently. There is no precise female counterpart to the emascula-
tion said to be experienced by men, perhaps because women do
not possess a privileged gender status. Depriving a woman of
her femininity has a different meaning than depriving a man of
his masculinity and is not invariably associated with loss of
status. Instead, I suspect that the dignitary harm many tradi-
tionally-minded women experience when they discover their
husband's adultery is related to a sense of inadequacy-that
they question why their husband was "forced" to look to some-
one else to fulfill his needs.144 This lowering of self-worth is a
status harm, to be sure, but unlike emasculation, the cause is
likely not to be located in the predatory behavior of a third
party, but in the victim's own perception of her loss of value as
a sexual object.
As I have described these gendered dignitary harms, they
are not the sort of injury that the law ought to redress. The
sense of honor that is damaged in each of these scenarios is de-
rived from an outmoded hierarchical image of husband and
wife, in which the wife is treated as the property of the hus-
band and the marriage is organized primarily to serve the hus-
band's sexual and emotional needs.145 I fear that legal recogni-
AND BETRAYAL 45-49 (1988) (explaining intolerance of wife's adultery as
stemming from men's insecurity regarding paternity of children and their de-
sire for "absolute property" in their wives' person and body); Constantina
Safilios-Rothschild, Attitudes of Greek Spouses Toward Marital Infidelity, in
EXTRA-MARITAL RELATIONS 78-79 (Gerhard Neubeck ed., 1969) (asserting
that in the Greek culture, toleration of a wife's adultery is considered to be
"unmanly").
144. I am indebted to Lu-in Wang for this point.
145. The older view of adultery focused on what was regarded as the
"theft" of the wife by another man. Under Roman law, for example, the of-
fense centered on the taking of a man's wife and subjected both the adulterous
wife and her lover to death or exile. Married men, however, were generally
permitted to take up with mistresses or concubines, provided only that they
did not bring these women into the marital home. See LAWSON, supra note
143, at 42. The Anglo-American tort of criminal conversation which permitted
husbands to sue their wives' lovers for interfering with their exclusive sexual
rights is also grounded in the notion that the wife is the property of the hus-
band. Recovery in criminal conversation suits were regarded as adultery
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tion of such harms would run a great risk of reproducing the
sexist ideology behind these gendered scripts and perpetuating
the objectification of women, even if, in some cases, the suffer-
ing of an individual woman was acknowledged through pun-
ishment of her husband for adultery.
Finally, in a comparatively small subset of cases, adultery
might produce an environmental harm,146 in the event that the
adulterer is the betrayed spouse's commanding officer or a peer
in the same military unit. One can imagine a situation, for ex-
ample, where the rage of the "betrayed" husband is intensified
because he has to take orders from the man who broke up his
marriage and cannot fight back without jeopardizing his ca-
reer.147 Or, to take another example, a conflict might arise
where two men in the same unit find that they can no longer
work together because of the resentment created by their in-
volvement with the same woman. Such conflicts could con-
ceivably spill over to affect other relationships in the unit:
48
payments, compensating the husband for loss of his property-like interests.
See id. at 43.
146. In one case outside the military, however, a court rejected a claim of
constructive discharge made by an employee who suffered humiliation and
stress when he learned that his wife-also an employee-was having an affair
with the boss. See Kader v. Paper Software, 111 F.3d 337, 341 (2d Cir. 1997).
The court did not believe that the plaintiff had been subjected to an intoler-
able working condition, deliberately created by the employer, because there
was no showing that the purpose of the affair was to force the husband to
quit. See id. at 339. Even though all the parties worked in close proximity to
one another, the court treated the affair as a private matter that the employer
had no duty to ameliorate. See id. at 341 n.4.
147. The case of Major General David Hale seems to fit within this frame-
work. Hale was alleged to have blackmailed the wife of his deputy into having
sex with him. While the investigation was pending, Hale requested that he be
allowed to leave the military and was honorably discharged. See Mark
Thompson, Sex, The Army and a Double Standard, TIME, May 4, 1998, at 30-
32. A report by the inspector general later disclosed that Hale had engaged in
sexual relationships with wives of four officers under his command during as-
signments in Hawaii and Turkey. In response to the case, the Army tightened
its procedures for approving the retirement of senior officers. See Bradley
Graham, Hale Case Spurs Tighter Army Retirement Process, WASH. POST,
July 8, 1998, at A4.
148. See, e.g., City of Sherman v. Henry, 928 S.W.2d 464 (Tex. 1996)
(involving a police officer who was denied a promotion because he had an af-
fair with another officer's wife who also served on the same police force). The
court upheld the city's action against a constitutional challenge. See id. at
474. A concurrence noted that the affair had cast doubt on the plaintiffs
ability to command the trust of his fellow officers which was deemed
"necessary in a paramilitary organization." Id. at 476 (Spector, J., concur-
ring).
342 [Vol. 83:305
THE NEW GENDER PANIC
the officer could lose the respect of the "betrayed" soldier's
friends or factions could develop within the unit as the soldiers
are forced to choose sides in the personal conflict.
It must be stressed, however, that these environmental
harms would generally occur only in the rare case where more
than one of the affected parties (i.e., among the accused, spouse
and co-actor) are in the military and located in close physical
proximity.1 49 Such an environmental harm is not strictly
speaking a by-product of adultery, in the sense that it flows
specifically from the commission of adultery. Rather, it is a
special instance of the difficult problems associated with man-
aging conflicts of interests within a working group, conflicts
that can be presented by sexual relationships when there is no
adultery, by close personal friendships and generally by mixing
professional and personal affairs in ways that give rise to seri-
ous ethical questions. As I will develop further in the discus-
sion of the military's prohibition of fraternization, 150 I believe
that these environmental harms are best addressed directly as
breaches of professional ethics. There is no need to criminalize
the broad category of adultery to reach such a narrow band of
behavior.
In sum, none of the harms listed above justify the crimi-
nalization of adultery, either inside or outside the military.
Regardless of the standards we might ultimately endorse for
persons holding high public office, I am confident that there is
little public sentiment for encouraging employers to penalize or
dismiss employees because of extramarital relationships that
have little direct impact on job performance or on the working
environment. The tolerance for non-marital sex that has de-
veloped over the last three decades and the construction of a
149. It is also conceivable that mere knowledge of a soldier's adulterous
relationship with a civilian could produce environmental effects in a special
case. Suppose, for example, that a married officer's open affair with a civilian
woman somehow undermined his "moral authority" to command his troops,
such that they refused to obey orders or became demoralized. This scenario,
however, is far more likely to occur where there is a widespread belief that
adultery is invariably immoral and that adulterers do not deserve to be in
leadership positions. Because I argue that there is no longer such a consensus
on these points, it is no longer rational to presume that adultery alone will
produce these harmful environmental effects. The current military standard
which allows the fact finder to consider putative damage to reputation and
morale as a harmful environmental effect of adultery, see supra text accom-
panying notes 128-31, too easily converts a moral belief about adultery and
adulterers into an environmental harm.
150. See infra text accompanying notes 191-206.
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realm of private morality separate from the public sphere of
work is not likely to dissipate quickly. In this regard, the rules
against adultery in the military seem archaic, difficult to un-
derstand and even more difficult to defend.
2. Constructive Force
In striking contrast to the military rules on adultery, other
prohibitions on sexual misconduct-particularly the concepts
of "constructive force" and "sexual harassment"-fit more com-
fortably within feminist conceptions of sexual morality than
within the traditionalist framework. The last thirty years have
witnessed a transformation in the meaning of "consent" in sex-
ual relationships, the all-important line that is now routinely
used to separate permissible from impermissible conduct.
Prior to modern feminist legal reforms, the most prominent
understanding of "consent" came from the criminal law and
was roughly synonymous with lack of physical resistance on
the part of the victim. Women who did not subjectively desire
to have sex were nevertheless deemed to have consented often
because there was insufficient evidence of overpowering physi-
cal force. Many legal feminists, such as Susan Estrich 151 and
Catharine MacKinnon, 152 argued that "consent" should not be
presumed from a lack of physical resistance. Instead, they
challenged the law to redefine "consent" by taking the victim's
as well as the perpetrator's perspective into account. Once the
victim's viewpoint was acknowledged, there was a greater un-
derstanding of the types of pressures, short of overpowering
physical force, that might compel a woman to submit to sexual
advances against her will.153
The feminist-inspired redefinition of consent paved the
way for the development of the new body of sexual harassment
law. The first Supreme Court sexual harassment case-
MeNtor Savings Bank v. Vinson 154-declared that "consent" as
formerly understood was not a defense to a claim of sexual
151. See SuSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 29-41 (1987) (critiquing the resis-
tance requirement).
152. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOwARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE
STATE 172-83 (1989) (critiquing legal interpretations of consent in rape cases).
153. Those pressures include the threat of physical force, either explicit or
implicit, economic coercion, and deception. See Chamallas, supra note 116, at
814-35 (discussing unacceptable inducements to sex).
154. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
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harassment. 155  Instead, the touchstone for determining
whether sexual conduct amounted to harassment was whether
the advances were "unwelcome" or unwanted. This new for-
mulation, of course, was not unambiguous-the Court left open
significant questions such as the type of proof that would be
accepted to prove unwelcomeness 156 and whether unwelcome-
ness ought to be judged from the perspective of the target or
the perpetrator. 157 What was critically important, however,
was the Court's acknowledgment that economically-coerced sex
was unlawful, even if the woman submitted to her supervisor's
advances and offered no physical resistance.
It should be noted that the redefinition of consent that oc-
curred in sexual harassment law has had only limited impact
in the criminal law. Although most states have abandoned the
requirement that rape victims offer actual physical resistance
to prove their lack of consent (or to meet the "force" require-
ment in rape statutes),158 it is doubtful that economically-
coerced sex (even of the quid pro quo variety) will suffice to es-
tablish rape under the criminal laws of most jurisdictions.
155. See id. at 68-69.
156. The Court noted that a plaintiffs provocative dress or public expres-
sion of sexual fantasies could be admitted into evidence to discredit her alle-
gations and defeat her claim. See id. at 69. Several commentators have criti-
cized this aspect of Meritor Savings Bank. See, e.g., Susan Estrich, Sex at
Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 827 (1991); Wendy Pollack, Sexual Harassment:
Women's Experience vs. Legal Definitions, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 35, 57
(1990). Congress recently amended Rule 412 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
to preclude admission in most cases of plaintiffs sexual history or plaintiffs
sexual predisposition (including evidence regarding dress and appearance).
See Jane Harris Aiken, Sexual Character Evidence in Civil Actions: Refining
the Propensity Rule, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 1221, 1222.
157. The debate over perspective continues to rage, not only with respect
to the "unwelcomeness" element of the harassment claim, but also as to proof
that the harassment was "severe or pervasive," another element of the claim.
See generally Martha Chamallas, Feminist Constructions of Objectivity: Mul-
tiple Perspectives in Sexual and Racial Harassment Litigation, 1 TEX. J.
WOMEN & LAW 95 (1992). The most recent Supreme Court case indicates that
the fact finder should judge the harasser's conduct from the perspective of a
person in plaintiffs position, taking into account the social context of the inci-
dents. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1003
(1998).
158. At present, a major point of debate is whether unauthorized penetra-
tion is sufficient evidence of "force" in those states that require proof of both
"force" and "lack of consent" in rape prosecutions. Compare State ex rel.
M.T.S., 129 N.J. 422 (1992) (holding that penetration itself is sufficient force)
with Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 415 Pa. Super. 505 (1992), affd in part and
vacated in part, 641 A.2d 1161 (Pa. 1994) (requiring additional showing of
forcible compulsion beyond nonconsensual penetration).
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Unless there is at least a threat of physical force, rape convic-
tions are hard to secure. In the civilian world, the remaking of
consent has often taken place in the context of civil litigation.159
The recent court-martial of Staff Sergeant Delmar Simp-
son has highlighted the contested nature of the concept of con-
sent. Simpson was charged under Article 120 of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice, the rape provision, which requires
proof that the accused committed sexual intercourse "by force
and without consent" of the victim. 60 As mentioned earlier,
161
the rape charges against Simpson were based on his use of
"constructive force." Simpson's lawyer argued that because he
did not use a weapon, exert physical force or specifically
threaten to use physical force, the charges should be dis-
missed. 62 The defense also stressed that some of the trainees
who submitted to Simpson's advances offered no physical or
verbal resistance to his orders.1 63 The trial judge rejected
Simpson's restrictive definition of constructive force, however,
and sent the case to the jury to decide whether Simpson's con-
duct constituted coercion.'6
159. I do not mean to suggest that there has been no change in the crimi-
nal law, only that a more thoroughgoing revision of the concept of consent has
occurred in the civil context, most notably with respect to sexual harassment
law. In fact, following Wisconsin's lead, some states have revised their rape
law to emphasize that resistance is not required and have redefined consent
more affirmatively to include only words and actions by the victim which indi-
cate freely given consent. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.225(4) (1996), discussed
in Chamallas, supra note 116, at 800.
160. By requiring that the act be both by force and without consent, Article
120 adopts the traditional definition of rape. Theoretically, at least, noncon-
sensual intercourse accomplished without the use of "force" is not rape under
this definition. It is this aspect of traditional rape law that has generated
much feminist criticism and many attempts to define and refine the concept of
force to capture virtually all instances of nonconsensual intercourse. See su-
pra notes 151-53. To my mind, rape should encompass all instances of non-
consensual intercourse, except for those unusual cases in which the accused
could not have reasonably understood that the woman did not wish to have
sex. Because some rapes are more heinous than others and cause more dam-
age, however, it seems appropriate to consider the nature and degree of force
used in determining punishment in the individual case.
16L See supra notes 25-26 (citing newspaper reports of the Simpson case).
162. See Army Judge, In Disputed Ruling, Refuses to Drop Rape Charges,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1997, at A20 [hereinafter Army Judge].
163. Some of the recruits, however, testified that they did attempt to push
Simpson away and were unsuccessful and that Simpson ignored their resis-
tance and pinned them down. See Priest & Spinner, supra note 25
(recounting details of the Simpson case).
164. See Army Judge, supra note 162, at 20.
[Vol. 83:305346
THE NEW GENDER PANIC
As the trial judge explained it, the doctrine of "constructive
force" was broad enough to cover cases in which a drill ser-
geant abuses his authority to compel unwilling recruits to give
in to sexual demands, even in the absence of specific threats or
a showing of force. The judge stressed that "drill sergeants
commanded so much authority over trainees-ordering them
where to eat and sleep and how to act-that they were like
parents" and that recruits were "conditioned to follow drill ser-
geants' orders."165 Because of the extraordinary power that
drill sergeants had over recruits, the court ruled that they did
not need to use a weapon or threaten the trainees with harm to
fit the definition of "constructive force." Instead, the jury was
to find Simpson guilty if it found that Simpson's actions cre-
ated "a reasonable belief in the victim's mind that death or
physical injury would be inflicted on her and resistance is fu-
tile." 66
The trial judge's definition of "constructive force" followed
a line of military cases in which rape convictions have been ob-
tained even though the victims offered no physical resistance
and the accused made no specific threats of physical harm.167
The requisite "force" and "lack of consent" have been found in
the victim's passive acquiescence and unwelcoming behavior
when ordered to submit to sexual intercourse by a superior of-
ficer. In one important case, 68 for example, a sergeant who
supervised a female trainee during basic training was con-
victed of rape when he ordered the trainee to follow him to an
isolated shed, grabbed and kissed her and ordered her to take
off her clothes. 69 The court found the requisite force in the act
of penetration itself, even though the trainee had not expressly
said "no," but manifested her lack of consent principally by not
165. Id. The judge's view of the extraordinary power of drill sergeants was
supported by the testimony of a private who explained why she did not resist
Simpson: "I just didn't feel like I had a choice .... He's a drill sergeant ....
He was supposed to know what's best for me." Jackie Spinner, Three More
Soldiers Testify Against Sergeant; Women Say They Had No Choice but to
Submit, WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 1997, at B3.
166. See Sciolino, supra note 35, at Al (reporting expert opinion on the
relevant legal standards in the Simpson case).
167. See Major Timothy W. Murphy, A Matter of Force: The Redefinition of
Rape, 39 A.F. L. REV. 19, 26-34 (1996) (discussing requirements of "force" and
"nonconsent" in military rape prosecutions).
168. See United States v. Clark, 35 M.J. 432 (C.M.A. 1992).
169. See id. at 433-34.
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returning the kiss and stiffening her body.170 In deciding that
the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction, the court
underscored "the unique situation of dominance and control
presented by appellant's superior rank and position.171 In
such cases, the label of "constructive force" allows the fact
finder to take a "totality of the circumstances" approach, per-
mitting consideration of all individual and social factors rele-
vant to a finding of coercion.172 This approach lessens the dan-
ger that the victim's failure to offer physical or verbal
resistance will be seized upon as the determinative factor, with
the result that sexual aggression may not be labeled rape sim-
ply because the victim's passivity gave the accused no reason to
use overpowering force to accomplish his objectives. 173
170. See id.
171. Id. at 436.
172. There is a mini-debate as to whether the totality of the circumstances
approach-in which one of the relevant factors is the disparity in power be-
tween the accused and the victim-is properly considered an inquiry into
"constructive force" or "actual force." One commentator would limit use of the
term "constructive force" to situations in which the victim is incapable of con-
senting (such as when the victim is asleep, unconscious or lacks mental ca-
pacity). He would classify all other contextualized inquiries into the coercive
nature of the encounter, including consideration of such evidentiary factors as
"intimidation, threats of harm, superior-subordinate coercion, and creation of
a coercive atmosphere (such as refusal to heed a victim's verbal protesta-
tions)" as inquiries into "actual consent." See Murphy, supra note 167, at 32-
33. My reaction is that use of the term "constructive force" is an apt way of
describing coercive encounters in which there is no application of physical
force beyond that typically used in consensual encounters (including the force
necessary to accomplish penetration). The term underscores that judgments
about sexual encounters require an interpretation or construction of events
and that, in some cases, the parties may have differing interpretations of the
same event. See Kim Lane Scheppele, The Re-Vision of Rape Law, 54 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1095, 1104-11 (1987) (discussing the "perceptual fault line" in sexual
encounters which accounts for differing perceptions of the same event).
173. The "totality of the circumstances" approach, however, often leaves
open the question of the perspective from which the encounter should be
judged-that is, from the perspective of the accused, from the victim's per-
spective or from the purportedly neutral perspective of a third party. Left
uninstructed, a jury is free to identify either with the accused or the victim
and to view events from their vantage point. It should be noted that in the
Simpson case, the trial judge instructed the jury to take the victim's perspec-
tive, i.e., to determine whether Simpson's conduct created "a reasonable belief
in the victim's mind that death or physical injury would be inflicted on her
and resistance is futile." Sciolino, supra note 35, at Al. See supra text ac-
companying note 166.
Generally, feminists have expressed concern that women's perspectives
on sexual matters have been submerged and are less likely to influence legal
judgments. See Scheppele, supra note 172. The issue of perspective has been
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The interpretation of "constructive force" used in Simp-
son's court-martial resembles feminist definitions of consent
and the standard of unwelcomeness used in sexual harassment
cases. 74 The emphasis is on abuse of power, stressing the ine-
quality in the relationship between drill sergeant and recruit.
It is also noteworthy that, similar to the plight of workers who
are forced to have sex with their boss to keep their job, the re-
cruits in the Simpson case likely feared that their military ca-
reers would be jeopardized if they resisted. In this respect, the
drill sergeant represents a particularly powerful kind of super-
visor, one who has the ability to affect a recruit's personal free-
dom as well as her job security. The Simpson court-martial
also was marked by close consideration of the context in which
the sexual conduct took place, permitting the jury to take into
account all the circumstances in making its determination of
coercion. They presumably were free to take into account the
recruit's fear relating to her status in the military as well as
her fear of imminent physical harm. Feminists have long ad-
vocated such a contextual approach in making determinations
of consent, particularly by insisting that the absence of physi-
cal or even verbal resistance on the part of the victim should
not be used as a litmus test in all cases.175
I do not know whether Simpson would have been convicted
on each count of rape had he been a civilian supervisor who
had extracted sex from young trainees under his supervision.
As mentioned earlier,17 6 few rape convictions are secured when
there is no clear threat of physical force, particularly if the vic-
tim does not explicitly say "no." Thus, with respect to at least
some of the charges of rape, a prosecutor in a civilian court
theorized and debated more extensively in the context of sexual harassment
law. See Chamallas, supra note 157, at 95 (discussing the "reasonable
woman" standard).
174. See Clarence Page, An Unjust Military Code?, SACRAMENTO BEE,
May 17, 1997, at B7 ('The Army has embraced the feminist definition of rape
as a crime of power and exploitation, not sex, especially when the power is as
wildly one-sided as it is between drill sergeants and trainees.").
175. One major theme in feminist writing is that "lack-of-consent inter-
course," even if not accompanied by violence in addition to forced penetration,
is degrading, scary and "excruciatingly painful." Lynne Henderson, Getting to
Know: Honoring Women in Law and in Fact, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & LAW 41, 64-
65 (1993); see also Robin L. West, Legitimating the Illegitimate: A Comment on
Beyond Rape, 93 COLUM:. L. REV. 1442, 1448 (1993), discussed in CHAMALLAS,
supra note 74, at 229-30.
176. See supra text accompanying notes 158-59 (discussing the evolving
definition of consent).
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may not have been able to prove the requisite "force" or
"nonconsent," and perhaps Simpson would not have been sen-
tenced to twenty-five years in jail had he been a civilian.177
However, even to ask this question may be to obscure a crucial
issue relating to the gross disparity in power between the tar-
get and the accused. If there is no civilian analogue to the drill
sergeant, no employment supervisor who commands the kind
of intimidating authority that was wielded by Simpson,178 it
may be pointless to compare the military's application of
"constructive force" doctrine to standards used in civilian rape
trials. However, I do think it is important to reflect on the fact
that Simpson received a long prison term for conduct that
might not have produced as readily a conviction in a civilian
prosecution. I have little doubt, however, that his conduct con-
stituted sexual harassment and would have subjected him to
civil liability if his actions were covered under Title VII. That
he faced criminal charges in the military demonstrates the de-
gree to which new definitions of consent have influenced mili-
tary justice and marks a departure from traditional criminal
law.
3. Fraternization
The final set of prohibitions relating to sexual miscon-
duct-the military's rules against fraternization-are the most
difficult to analyze and cannot be easily labeled as either tradi-
tional or feminist in character. The dictionary definition of
"fraternize" is to "associate with others in a brotherly or conge-
nial way."' 79 Originally "fraternization" referred to officers as-
sociating or fraternizing with enlisted personnel on terms of
177. For some, Simpson's sentence appeared lenient. Theoretically, Simp-
son could have been sentenced to life imprisonment for each of the 18 counts
of rape and up to 32 years in prison for the 11 counts of consensual sex to
which he pleaded guilty. One former Air Force colonel and a vice president of
the National Organization for Women complained that Simpson's 25 year sen-
tence was too light because it amounted to a mere 15 months for each rape
count. For others, the penalty was too harsh. A spokesman for the Congres-
sional Black Caucus described the sentence as "cruel and unusual." See Rich-
ter, supra note 26, at Al (describing reactions to the Simpson verdict). In ci-
vilian courts, sentences for rape range from several years in jail to life
imprisonment, depending on the circumstances, including the amount of force
used. See id.
178. The closest analogy may well be that of prison guard and inmate, an-
other context in which the supervisor exercises plenary power over the body
and activities of the subordinate.
179. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 541 (3d ed. 1993).
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military equality, most often in the context of financial trans-
actions such as loan agreements.180 More recently, however,
with growing numbers of women in the military,
"fraternization" has often been used as a code word for imper-
missible, consensual sexual relationships l l and each service
has had to grapple with determining precisely just which con-
sensual relationships it wishes to outlaw and which it will
permit.
The UCMJ is singularly unhelpful in drawing a clear de-
marcation line. Article 134 sets forth only general elements of
the offense, requiring a showing that the relationship violated
the custom of the accused's service and that the conduct was
"to the prejudice of good order and discipline... or was of a na-
ture to bring discredit upon the armed services,"8 2 the same
vague standard that applies in adultery cases. By its terms,
180. See DAVID A. SCHLUETER, MILITARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 2-8A, at 93 (4th ed. 1996).
181. As a matter of formal law, proof of the existence of a sexual relation-
ship is not necessary to establish the offense of fraternization against the cus-
toms of a particular service. The offense is technically complete if there is an
"illicit association between officers and enlisted personnel on terms of equal-
ity." See United States v. Nunes, 39 M.J. 889, 890 (A.F.C.M.R. 1994). How-
ever, even in Nunes, where no sexual relationship was proven, the defendant
officer's relationship with an enlisted man that formed the basis of the frater-
nization charge clearly had sexual overtones. Nunes, a doctor, was also
charged and convicted of indecent acts stemming from his medical examina-
tion of two male patients in the military hospital. See id. at 892. Thus, even
though the Nunes opinion recited a broad definition of fraternization as en-
compassing nonsexual as well as sexual conduct, the case itself dealt with
sexual conduct.
182. Specifically, there are five elements that must be proven to sustain a
charge of fraternization under Article 134:
(1) That the accused was a commissioned or warrant officer;
(2) That the accused fraternized on terms of military equality
with one or more certain enlisted member(s) in a certain manner;
(3) That the accused then knew the person(s) to be (an) enlisted
member(s);
(4) That such fraternization violated the custom of the accused's
service that officers shall not fraternize with enlisted members on
terms of military equality; and
(5) That, under the circumstances, the conduct of the accused
was to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces
or was of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.
See also United States v. Boyett, 42 M.J. 150, 152 n.3 (1995). Service mem-
bers guilty of fraternization may also be charged under Article 133 prohibiting
"conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman." Id. at 152 n.2. However, to
prove a violation under Article 133, the government must prove all the ele-
ments of fraternization under Article 134 plus the additional requirement of
conduct unbecoming an officer. See id. at 152.
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Article 134 covers only relationships between officers and en-
listed personnel and targets only the officer for criminal penal-
ties. However, the Code also authorizes each service to prom-
ulgate its own regulations on fraternization.18 3 These
regulations may reach not only relationships involving officers
and enlisted personnel, but also enlisted personnel of different
ranks and officers of different ranks. In cases covered by the
regulations, the lower-ranked individual may also be subject to
criminal penalties.184
The situation is very fluid. Until most recently, all
branches of the military prohibited sexual relationships be-
tween people of different ranks in the same chain of command.
Beyond this point, however, the policies of the services di-
verged. The Army was the most liberal, allowing dating be-
tween personnel of different ranks, provided that they are not
in the same chain of command. The Navy had clarified its
rules to prohibit both officers and enlisted sailors on the same
ship from dating, even where they are not in the same direct
chain of command.185 Similarly, the Air Force had tightened its
rules against fraternization to prohibit an officer from dating
an enlisted person, even when that person is outside the chain
of command.186
The latest initiative by Secretary of Defense Cohen takes
steps to establish more uniform policies among the Services.18 7
He has ordered each service to produce "similarly worded" poli-
cies and training material that would prohibit dating and sex-
ual relationships between officers and enlisted personnel,
reaching relationships outside the chain of command and ex-
tending even to members from different services.188 If imple-
183. Article 92 of the UCMJ authorizes prosecutions for fraternization in
violation of regulations.
184. One leading commentator doubts that enlisted personnel may be
prosecuted under Article 134 for fraternization. However, he asserts that en-
listed personnel are subject to prosecution under Article 92 prohibiting frat-
ernization in violation of regulations. See SCHLUETER, supra note 180, at 94-
97.
185. See Paul Richter & Mike Clary, The Business of Love; From Corpora-
tions to the Military, Policymakers Wonder How to React to Romance in the
Ranks, L.A. TIMES, May 19, 1997, at El.
186. See Boyett, 42 M.J. at 150 (upholding conviction of Air Force officer for
having sexual intercourse with enlisted person not under his supervision);
FLINN, supra note 59, at 157.
187. See NEWS RELEASE, July 29, 1998 <http://www.defenselink.mil/cgi-
bin/dlprint>.
188. The new initiative addresses a wide range of unprofessional relation-
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mented, the new policy would have the greatest impact on the
Army, requiring that service to end its more liberal tradition of
permitting dating and relationships outside the chain of com-
mand.
The policy rationales behind the prohibitions on fraterni-
zation are not self-evident, whether we examine the latest ini-
tiative 89 or the older policies. The major objective seems to be
to prevent a breakdown in discipline and probably has less to
do with feminist concerns with preventing sexual exploitation
and harassment. For example, one commentator reasons that
the anti-fraternization rules are justified to prevent favoritism,
or at least the appearance of favoritism, when the relationship
is between members of the same command. He notes that
"[u]ndue familiarity... tends to create disharmony and dis-
trust" when subordinates begin to expect or actually receive fa-
vored treatment or when the rest of the command perceives fa-
voritism at the expense of others similarly situated.190 There is
not much theorizing, however, about prohibitions that reach
beyond the chain of command, particularly the recent initiative
that potentially criminalizes consensual sexual relationships
between all officers and enlisted personnel. I can only specu-
late that some may view these broad bans as necessary to in-
sure that officers retain "respect" and are not somehow de-
meaned by their association with those of a lesser rank.
As was true in the case of adultery, the military rules on
fraternization tend to be stricter than those found in the civil-
ian workplace. Commentators claim that there is now an in-
ships, including sexual and nonsexual conduct. Specifically, the services were
instructed to produce policies and training materials that:
(1) Address how the policies are applied and enforced, and the
possible consequences of noncompliance in language that is clearly
understandable to all; (2) Prohibit personal relationships such as
dating, sharing living accommodations, engaging in intimate or sex-
ual relations, business enterprises, commercial solicitations, gam-
bling, and borrowing between officer and enlisted personnel, regard-
less of the member's Service. This change will not affect existing
marriages; (3) Prohibit personal relationships between recruiter and
recruit; and During Initial Entry Training, prohibit instructors and
staff from having personal relationships with trainees.
Id.
189. The news release announcing the new initiative stated that regulating
unprofessional relationships was justified because "even the perception that
members in positions of authority may have abused that authority or made
decisions based upon favoritism adversely affects morale and can degrade
readiness." Id.
190. SCHLUETER, supra note 180, at 93.
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creased acceptance of "dating"191 among co-workers and most
employers are reluctant to have explicit rules on the subject.192
At the same time, however, there is a heightened awareness
that consensual relationships can lead to charges of sexual
harassment, particularly if the relationship turns sour.193 This
has lead many employers to discourage-and sometimes to
prohibit-dating between employees when they are in a super-
visor-subordinate relationship. These "conflict of interest"
rules, it should be noted, are most often grounded in concerns
about the workplace environment,194 either that the sexual re-
lationship will negatively affect the parties' performance or
generate resentment and perceptions of favoritism among oth-
ers in the working group.195 The rules seem to have little to do
191. "Dating" is the euphemism most commonly used to describe engaging
in social activities with someone with whom the employee is sexually or ro-
mantically involved. The term, however, is not free from ambiguity. Onejudge has argued that "dating" need not be "encumbered" with an "amorous
interest component," citing the definition of "date" in Webster's Ninth New
Collegiate Dictionary as "a social engagement between persons of opposite
sex." State v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 621 N.Y.S. 158, 160-61 (App. Div. 1995)
(Yesawich, J., dissenting). Because most employers who prohibit dating
among co-workers, however, probably intend to reach same-sex as well as het-
erosexual relationships, use of the heterosexist dictionary definition of "date"
seems inappropriate in this context. There is, however, considerable difficulty
determining when going out with a friend turns into a "date."
192. See Anna M. De Palo, Antifraternizing Policies and At-Will Employ-
ment: Counseling for a Better Relationship, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 59, 62
(citing 1994 survey of human resource directors in which only 7.3% said that
their organization has a policy on co-worker dating); see also Kathleen M.
Hallinan, Invasion of Privacy or Protection Against Sexual Harassment: Co-
Employee Dating and Employer Liability, 26 COLuM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 435
(1993) (urging more employers to adopt explicit policies). But see Philip
Weiss, Don't Even Think About It (The Cupid Cops are Watching), N.Y. TIMES
MAG., May 3, 1998, at 45 (stating that one quarter of American companies
have oral or written policies on consensual relationships).
193. See Boddy v. Dean, 821 F.2d 346 (6th Cir. 1987); EEOC Guidance on
Sexual Harassment, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Man. (BNA) at 405:6687 (Mar. 19,
1990).
194. See, e.g., Crosier v. United Parcel Serv., 198 Cal. Rptr. 361, 366(1983), overruled by Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988)
(involving an employer that justified its rule prohibiting management employ-
ees from dating nonmanagement employees by citing concerns about sexual
harassment and appearances of favoritism). The unwritten rule was applied
to terminate a manager who had promoted a woman with whom he was living.
See Crosier, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 366.
195. Employers have complained about the "unstable nature of consent" in
cases in which a complaint of sexual harassment surfaced only after an office
romance had broken up. There are also a growing number of reports of com-
plaints by co-workers who allege that the lover of their supervisor received a
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with fears about the general reputation of the employer or the
"moral authority" of the supervisor engaged in the relation-
ship.19 6
Unlike the rules against adultery, however, at least some
of the military prohibitions on fraternization might well with-
stand feminist scrutiny. With respect to relationships within
the chain of command, a per se ban on consensual relation-
ships reduces the likelihood that officers will abuse their power
to pressure enlisted women to have sex, knowing that they will
not be able to defend against a charge of sexual misconduct by
alleging that the victim consented to or welcomed the conduct.
It could also be argued that the officer/enlisted soldier relation-
ship is so fundamentally asymmetric that it is simply too diffi-
cult to ensure that these sexual liaisons are not coerced or ex-
ploitive. Outside the military, for example, many universities
have chosen to ban even "consensual" professor/student rela-
tionships, at least in those instances where the professor has
some instructional responsibility for the student.197 A per se
ban thus might be seen as supportive of prohibitions against
sexual harassment by making it easier for those in charge to
enforce a bright-line rule without speculating as to the nature
of the sexual relationship. 9 8
promotion or other special treatment. See Weiss, supra note 192, at 46.
196. Similar to rules prohibiting adultery by employees, however, prohibi-
tions on dating are not likely to be declared unlawful. They are rarely struck
down as either unconstitutional in public employee suits or violative of public
policy in private employee wrongful discharge claims. Protection for man-
agement prerogative seems to exist even when there is no proof of a harmful
environmental effect or a conflict of interest. See Watkins v. United Parcel
Serv., 797 F. Supp. 1349 (S.D. Miss. 1992) (permissible to discharge manager
who disobeyed anti-fraternization policy forbidding sexual relationships be-
tween managers and employees); Patton v. J.C. Penney Co., 719 P.2d 854 (Or.
1986) (permissible to fire employee for dating co-employee, even in absence of
explicit no-dating rule). However, fewer reported cases involve single as op-
posed to married employees, suggesting perhaps that employers are more
likely to enforce no-dating rules in cases of adultery.
197. See Chamallas, supra note 116, at 843-61; Patrick Dilger, Putting an
End To Risky Romance, YALE ALUMNI MAG., Apr. 1998, at 30, 30 (discussing
Yale's new policy banning sexual relationships, even if consensual, between
teachers and students over whom they have direct supervisory responsibility);
Carol Sanger, The Erotics of Torts, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1852 (1998) (reviewing
JANE GALLOP, FEMINIST ACCUSED OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT (1997)).
198. From the perspective of those enforcing the law, per se bans on con-
sensual relationships have other advantages. Because of the restrictions on
consensual relationships, military authorities presently have the option of
charging defendants with fraternization and/or adultery in cases in which the
evidence of coercion is arguably too weak to sustain a charge of rape or sexual
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Finally, with respect to recruits in basic training, it is
worth noting that this is a time of great vulnerability. Basic
training cuts off young men and women from their family and
friends and subjects them to what is often the most rigorous
and stressful experience in their lives. In such circumstances,
the person in charge has a disproportionate psychological edge,
not unlike the divorce lawyer who handles an emotionally-
laden case for his client 99 or other professionals who treat or
perform services for especially vulnerable populations.200 Ban-
ning sex between drill sergeants and recruits thus seems in
line with the trend toward ethical bans on professional/client
(or patient) sex in various civilian contexts, even absent direct
proof of a conflict of interest or evidence of exploitation.
Even if they do not share the traditionalists' zeal for pro-
motion of military discipline, feminists may well conclude that
bans on sex within the chain of command make sense. How-
ever, these feminist justifications for anti-fraternization rules
would suggest that only the higher-ranked officer or service
member should be subject to sanctions. There is little justice
in punishing an enlisted service member as a way of
"protecting" that individual from being exploited.
harassment. This considerably strengthens the hand of prosecutors. Addi-
tionally, during the Simpson court-martial, there was concern that some of
the women who accused Simpson of rape did so in part because they feared
that if they admitted that the sex was consensual, they could be prosecuted
for violations of military regulations against consensual sex. See Page, supra
note 174, at B7.
199. See Caroline Forell, Hands-OffRule is Unique, 54 OR. ST. B. BULL. 34
(July 1994); Caroline Forell, Lawyers, Clients and Sex: Breaking the Silence on
the Ethical and Liability Issues, 22 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 611 (1992); John
Freeman, Sex with Clients: A Recipe for Disaster, 8 S.C. LAW. 10 (1996); David
Pincus, Lawyers in Lust: Does New York's New Rule Addressing Attorney-
Client Relations Do Enough?, 2 J.L. & POLY 249 (1994).
200. The American Psychiatric Association and the American Psychological
Association have ethical rules forbidding sex with current patients. See
AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, THE PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS: WITH
ANNOTATIONS ESPECIALLY APPLICABLE TO PSYCHIATRY § 2(1) (1995);
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL AsS'N, ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS
AND CODE OF CONDUCT STANDARD § 4.05 (1992). See generally Catherine S.
Leffler, Note, Sexual Conduct Within the Physician-Patient Relationship: A
Framework for Disciplining this Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 1 WIDENER L.
SYMP. J. 501 (1996). Several states also make it a crime for a prison guard to
engage in sexual relations with an inmate. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
53a-71(a)(5) (1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 944.35 (West 1998); ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/11-9.2 (West 1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:14-2(6)(c)(3) (West 1979);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.05 (1997).
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It is more difficult to come up with feminist justifications
to support a ban on consensual sex outside the chain of com-
mand. The lack of direct supervision tends to lessen the oppor-
tunity for sexual coercion and retaliation and may not present
the target with the stark dilemma of having to choose between
disappointing her supervisor or denying her own wishes. How-
ever, one thoughtful proposal has been made endorsing a pro-
hibition beyond the chain of command. Professor Madeline
Morris has recently recommended a broadened fraternization
policy that would prohibit sexual relationships, regardless of
rank, within military units.201 Interestingly, her proposal does
not focus on preventing abuses of power by persons of higher
rank. Instead, her concern is with the danger of permitting
peers in the special, close-knit context of the military unit to
engage in sexual relations. Her call for a military "incest ta-
boo"202 is an attempt to assure cohesion and a family-like struc-
ture for gender-integrated units. The objective is to reduce the
risk that sexual tensions and jealousies will prevent the forma-
tion of bonds among male and female soldiers. Her proposal is
animated by a desire to improve the status of women in the
military and echoes concerns of feminists that, in general,
sexualized workplaces pose a greater risk of sexual harassment
because even consensual relationships may tend to erode the
professional atmosphere of a particular work setting.
In another respect, however, Morris's proposal seems quite
traditional: she implies that heterosexual relationships inevi-
tably produce a competition among men for the available
women and that there is no sexual tension in all-male groups.
As I will discuss more fully in the next section,203 it may be a
mistake to assume that all-male groups are asexual, even
when gay men are expressly excluded. The other troublesome
aspect of the incest taboo is its potential to reinforce images of
women as sexual commodities, as objects of desire that distract
201. Morris, supra note 52, at 757.
202. Id. at 757-60. Anthropologist Margaret Mead first argued for an
"incest taboo" with respect to relationships between male and female co-
workers generally. See Margaret Mead, A Proposal: We Need Taboos on Sex
at Work, REDBOOK, Apr., 1978, at 31. Mead believed that legal prohibitions
alone would be insufficient to protect women from sexual harassment or other
discriminatory conduct in the workplace without the existence of deeper ta-
boos against sex between workers, roughly comparable to the "relationship of
brothers and sisters who have grown up together safely within a household."
Id. at 33.
203. See infra text accompanying notes 218-57.
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men from more important business. The incest taboo assures
that only the desexualized woman is allowed access to formerly
male enclaves, precisely to preserve the male character of these
groups. Traditionalists argue that male bonding in the ab-
sence of women is essential for soldiers who might some day be
called into combat.204 Though it does not call for the exclusion
of women, Morris's incest taboo might play into these exclu-
sionary impulses, insofar as it signals that female sexuality is
dangerous, even when a woman consents to a relationship and
in other respects is equal in status to her sexual partner. My
problem with the incest taboo is that it seems to accept the pro-
totype of the male fighting unit as intimate but asexual and
implicitly conditions women's access on their willingness to
give up the sexual aspect of their femaleness. In a subtle way,
I believe that the incest taboo reinforces a male norm that was
developed in an all-male culture-the message is that whether
or not women are allowed, female sexuality is still off limits. 205
In the final analysis, it is not clear that feminist-inspired
arguments such as Morris's provide adequate justification for
the military rules against fraternization outside the chain of
command. Obviously her proposal for an incest taboo provides
no support for the recent anti-fraternization initiative that
would ban relationships between officers and enlisted person-
nel from different units. Moreover, like the rules against adul-
tery, there is a danger of selective enforcement of broad policies
that ban dating and relationships beyond the working unit.
While I have not seen empirical evidence to support this claim,
particularly after the Kelly Flinn case, critics of the military's
anti-fraternization rules have claimed that there is a double
standard of enforcement and that women are targeted more
frequently and receive harsher punishments than men.206
204 See Anna Simons, In War Let Men be Men, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1997,
at A23 (arguing that male bonding is critical to the effectiveness of Green Be-
rets in part because the men feel free to talk about sex in the absence of
women).
205. Whether or not there is a formal ban on consensual relationships
within military units, women will still face difficult decisions as to whether to
date or get involved with men in their units. Describing her experiences at
the Air Force Academy, Kelly Flinn noted that male cadets tended to label
female cadets as either "worthy virgins or incompetent whores." Female ca-
dets who had sex with their "peers" could suffer a loss of respect. On the
other hand, female cadets who slept with no one were liable to be called lesbi-
ans, an intimidating allegation given the ban on homosexuals. See FLINN, su-
pra note 59, at 75-76.
206. See Margery Eagan, Pilot's Ordeal Shows Military's Double Standard,
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Most importantly, I worry that even the more limited incest
taboos may backfire and acquire a social meaning that makes
women "taboo." I concede that it is possible that a ban against
sex within military units might promote closer relationships
and bonding between male and female soldiers. But there is
also a risk that a ban of sex among peers would simply rein-
force the traditional view that women and female sexuality are
a danger and a distraction to the enterprises of men, thereby
diminishing the chances that gender integration will bring
about a transformation of military culture. The lesson of the
recent gender panic may be that we should proceed with cau-
tion in regulating sexual relationships that present little con-
crete danger of abuse of power.
4. The Need for Reconceptualization
This analysis of rules governing sexual misconduct in the
military suggests the need for a reconceptualization of some of
the basic offenses. To be sure, the military may present an
acute case for reform, particularly because of the recent gender
panic and because the penalties for sexual misconduct in the
military are so severe. However, the tension between tradi-
tional and feminist visions of sexual ethics present in the en-
forcement of sex-related rules in the military is also present in
the larger society. Many of the suggestions I offer here may
well have merit for the civilian work force as well.
Perhaps the one noncontroversial point to be made is that
there is currently no widespread agreement on what consti-
tutes ethical sexual conduct and therefore no consensus as to
the proper reach of the law. Particularly in such a volatile area
as the legal regulation of sexual conduct, I am mindful of the
fact that those closer to the situation are in a better position to
judge whether the reconceptualization of basic offenses I offer
here would indeed further my ultimate goal of gender equity in
the military.
I start from the basic premise that, as in the civilian world,
the touchstone for dividing permissible from impermissible
sexual conduct should generally be the consent of the parties.
Nonconsensual sexual conduct should be subject to legal sanc-
tions, for the very simple yet important reason that it causes
great harm to the health, welfare and dignity of individuals.
Consensual sexual conduct, on the other hand, should be
BOSTON HERALD, May 18, 1997, at A8.
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treated as presumptively lawful and should be restricted only
when there is good reason for doing so. Particularly for
women, there is a great danger that even laws designed to pro-
tect women's interests may end up reinforcing old views of
women as the sexual property of men and as a separate class of
persons who cannot be trusted to make important decisions af-
fecting their own lives.
To some extent, of course, the military rules governing
sexual conduct reflect this basic value judgment. As a matter
of formal law at least, rape and sexual harassment are recog-
nized as serious offenses under the code of military justice and
punished more severely than adultery or fraternization. How-
ever, the military rules governing consensual sexual conduct
reflect values other than preserving the sexual integrity of
service members, at least as I interpret the ban on adultery
and the anti-fraternization regulations restricting consensual
relationships outside the chain of command.
The rule against adultery is premised on the view that ex-
tramarital sex is immoral and at its core protects the marriage
relationship, rather than the relationships among service per-
sonnel. Even though it is possible to enforce the ban against
adultery sparingly and selectively only in those relatively rare
cases in which the adultery causes the kind of environmental
harm I described above (where, for example, a commanding of-
ficer has an affair with the spouse of an enlisted man or
woman under his charge),207 this selective deployment only un-
derscores the need to rethink the nature of the harm that is
being vindicated through criminal prosecution. If, as I suggest,
it is not the commission of adultery per se that is the problem,
but the conflict of interest and environmental harm that arises
in some cases of adultery, then it might be better to rename the
offense and define it differently. Thus, a married officer who
has a sexual relationship with a soldier under his direct com-
mand might still be subject to court-martial or other punitive
administrative action. Under my reconceptualization of sex-
related crimes, however, the punishment would not stem from
the fact that the officer was married, but from his breach of
ethics in entering into a conflict-laden sexual relationship
which carried too great a risk of sexual exploitation of the
lower-ranked party and too much potential for environmental
damage.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 146-47.
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In short, I contend that adultery as a separate offense
apart from more specific breaches of workplace sexual ethics
should be abolished. I fear that as long as Article 134 outlaws
"adultery"-even with the new guidance interpreting the
"prejudice" and "discrediting" requirements 20 8-it will be too
difficult to sever the offense from its traditionalist moorings.
Sexual ethics in the military-like sexual ethics in the civilian
workplace-should not depend on the marital status of the par-
ties. The harms of adultery are best addressed as private
harms, to be dealt with by the spouses themselves pursuant to
their own understanding of their particular relationship.
I would also rename and reorient the offense of fraterniza-
tion. Like adultery, the offense seems to be grounded in no-
tions of status. It is designed primarily to preserve hierarchy,
not to protect the sexual integrity of less powerful persons or
even to ameliorate the conflicts of interests that arise when the
person in charge has an intimate relationship with a person
under his direct command. As a status crime, fraternization
could conceivably reach a wide range of social interactions be-
tween an officer and an enlisted member which threatens to
undermine the officer's status. In their current sexualized
meaning, however, the anti-fraternization rules are incoherent
and place too much emphasis on the dangers of sexual conduct,
as opposed to other overly-familiar behavior. The Air Force, for
example, now prohibits an officer from dating an enlisted per-
son, even when that person is outside the chain of command. 209
Thus a male officer whose "drinking buddy" is an enlisted man
in another unit probably is in no danger of court-martial or
administrative discipline. But if the same officer dates an en-
listed woman in another unit, he might be charged with frater-
nization. This pattern of enforcement signals that sex with an
inferior (who most often will be a woman) is the one type of
boundary-crossing conduct that most threatens discipline and
good order.
The rules against consensual sex in each service suggest
that sex is the problem in and of itself, without focusing closely
enough on the precise harms that consensual sexual relation-
ships actually present in the particular environment. The
gender panic makes me fear that-as in the phrase
"fraternizing with the enemy"--anti-fraternization rules will
208. See supra text accompanying notes 132-50.
209. See supra text accompanying note 186.
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serve to further marginalize and isolate female service mem-
bers who are still a relatively small minority in the military.
Although the term "fraternization" could again be retooled
to encompass nonsexual and sexual conduct that poses a dan-
ger of conflict of interest or exploitation of lower-ranked service
members, I would prefer to jettison the term, with its brotherly
and sexual connotations. In its place, I think it is preferable to
refer to the conduct simply as a breach of ethics, underscoring
that sexual ethics is but a subset of larger ethical responsibili-
ties. On this front, the terminology used in the new initiative
to establish a uniform policy on "unprofessional" relationships
seems a step in the right direction.
This shift in terminology, of course, would not solve the
critically important issue of when to ban consensual sexual
relationships, particularly outside the chain of command. As
discussed above, 210 I remain unconvinced that there is a strong
reason for banning such relationships, either among persons of
the same rank in the same unit (the "incest taboo") or between
officers and enlisted personnel when the officer is outside the
chain of command.
It may well be that the demands of discipline within the
unit, the young age of many service members and the fact that,
unlike civilian workers, many military members cannot go
"home" and escape the pressures of their job, means that
greater attention should be paid to the twin dangers of possible
sexual exploitation of subordinates and conflicts of interest
arising from actual or perceived favoritism of sexual partners.
These considerations provide solid grounding for a per se ban
on consensual sexual relationships between superiors and sub-
ordinates within the chain of command.21' To my mind, how-
ever, these considerations do not warrant broad bans on con-
sensual conduct outside the chain of command that are
grounded in more diffuse harms. Although the boundary lines
may sometimes be blurry,212 there does seem to be a salient dif-
210. See supra text accompanying notes 201-06.
211. Just as in the civilian workplace, it may not always be a simple mat-
ter to determine whether a particular relationship falls within or outside of
the chain of command. Enforcement of these ethical rules should be sensitive
to context. This is a matter that must be decided locally, by someone who
knows the specific responsibilities of the persons involved and how decisions
affecting service members are actually made.
212. See supra note 149 (discussing the boundary between environmental
harm and moral disapproval).
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ference between an environmental harm within a working
group and less concrete concerns for deterioration of morale,
reputation, or level of respect. Particularly when the sanctions
are criminal in nature, I would err on the side of more privacy.
Finally, with respect to the all-important issue of the defi-
nition of "consent" in cases of rape and sexual harassment, I
endorse the willingness of military judges to recognize that of-
ficers are in a position to exercise "constructive force" to pres-
sure those under their command to submit to sex against their
will.21 3 Victims should not be required to offer resistance in
every case. Nor should the offender escape punishment simply
because he does not resort to physical force or explicit threats
of physical force. The recent gender panic, however, does make
me wonder whether the prison term of twenty-five years meted
out to Staff Sergeant Delmar Simpson may be too harsh, par-
ticularly when we compare his treatment to similarly situated
offenders outside the military or to more highly-ranked offend-
ers within the military. Most significantly, because military
defendants may not bring civil rights claims for racial dis-
crimination, 214 there is insufficient assurance that the courts-
martial of Simpson and McKinney were not tainted by racial
bias. The lack of availability of civil rights suits in the military
context means that we lose the valuable opportunity of having
a jury decide claims of gender and race discrimination under a
preponderance of the evidence standard. Such civil rights suits
have the advantage of allowing vindication of plaintiffs' rights
without sending offenders to jail. Particularly in the highly
contested area of the legal regulation of sexual conduct, such a
compromise is of great utility.
Although it might seem odd for a feminist to argue for
moderation in the punishment of rape and sexual harassment,
such a position has been taken by feminist activists outside the
military context since the rape reform movement of the 1970s.
Two of the main objectives of the rape reform movement were
to increase the number of victims who were willing to report
they had been raped and to increase the number of convictions
of those charged with rape.215 These objectives could only be
secured, however, if the system of enforcing rape laws was per-
213. See supra text accompanying notes 160-75.
214. See supra notes 9-10.
215. See CASSIA SPOHN & JULIE HORNEY, RAPE LAW REFORM: A
GRASSROOTS REVOLUTION AND ITS hIPACT 21 (1992).
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ceived to be effective and fair. There was a recognition that
imposition of draconian penalties in a few rape cases could only
undermine reform efforts aimed at consistent and commensu-
rate punishment. Thus women's rights groups have success-
fully opposed the death penalty for rape216 and have lobbied for
grading the offense of rape according to the severity of the in-
jury inflicted and the type of force used.217 In the long run, dis-
proportionately severe penalties, even for those convicted of the
heinous crime of rape, tend to discourage prosecutions and in-
vite selective enforcement of the law against racial minorities
and other less privileged groups of men. I suspect that mili-
tary justice is not immune from these dangers.
C. THE SOCIAL MEANING OF GENDER
There is a widespread belief that the military is quintes-
sentially a "male" institution 218 and that it is unrealistic to ex-
pect that changes relating to gender in the larger society will
necessarily penetrate this last bastion of male supremacy.
Given that women have now secured a presence in the mili-
tary, at least comparable to their representation in corporate
board rooms and other male-dominated sectors, it is time to
look more closely at what we mean by the "maleness"219 of the
military and how that might affect the specific policy issues we
have been addressing. The recent scholarship 220 on gender and
the military has focused on military culture as the term that
best conveys the complex of attitudes, daily interactions and
institutional structures that can give us a clue as to why the
military might be so resistant to women and so fearful of
feminization.
216. See HERMA HILL KAY & MARTHA S. WEST, SEX-BASED DISCRIMI-
NATION 1162 (4th ed. 1996) (discussing amicus briefs in Coker v. Georgia, 433
U.S. 584 (1977)).
217. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Taking Sexual Autonomy Seriously: Rape
Law and Beyond, 11 LAW & PHIL. 35, 38 (1992); Patricia Searles & Ronald J.
Berger, The Current Status of Rape Reform Legislation: An Examination of
State Statutes, 10 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 25, 25-27 (1987).
218. See, e.g., Lucinda Peach, Women at War: The Ethics of Women in
Combat, 15 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 199, 207-09 (1994).
219. An English professor at the Naval Academy has described the
"maleness" of that institution by noting that "[alt the Naval Academy, we no
longer exclude women, but (whether we admit it or not) we still exclude the
female." See Bruce Fleming, Gay Poets, Women, and Other Threats to Group
Loyalty at the Naval Academy, CHRON. HIGHER EDUc., Jan. 30, 1998, at B4.
220. See Abrams, supra note 50; Karst, supra note 51; Morris, supra note
52.
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An eloquent voice in the literature is that of Kenneth
Karst, who regards the military as an important site for the
construction of masculinity.221 In his view, the military is
"male" not only because it contains eighty-five percent men and
has been even more intensely male-dominated for its entire
history. The "maleness" of the military also derives impor-
tantly from its capacity to function as a symbol of what it
means to be a man, that is, to produce and reproduce meanings
of masculinity. In his words: "Masculinity is traditionally de-
fined around the idea of power; the armed forces are the na-
tion's preeminent symbol of power; and not incidentally, 'the
Marines are looking for a few good men.' The symbolism is not
a side effect; it is the main point."222
The bad news for women is that many contemporary theo-
rists tell us that masculinity is often defined through opposi-
tion-that we can best tell what is masculine by what is not
feminine.223 Since Simone de Beauvoir developed the concept
of the "other" in The Second Sex,224 many feminist theorists
have approached gender as a socially constructed concept that
tells us more about dominant views of masculinity than about
the nature of women. Political theorist Sally Kenney explains
that "[mien are defined and define themselves in opposition to
a set of categories assigned to women, usually whatever quali-
ties or characteristics are less valued for the fully human, ra-
tional, creative or competent."22 5 This point should be distin-
guished from the more traditional view that regards men and
women as different and complementary. The observation made
by Karst and others is that masculinity as an identity is often
built around the exclusion (and subordination) of women and
221. See Karst, supra note 51.
222. Id. at 501.
223. See Michelle M. Benecke & Kirstin S. Dodge, Military Women in Non-
traditional Job Fields: Casualties of the Armed Forces' War on Homosexuals,
13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 215, 234-35 (1990); ENLOE, supra note 126, at 13 ("To
be masculine is to be not feminine."); Karst, supra note 51, at 503
("[MI asculinity begins in escape-the perceived need to separate from a femi-
nine identity.").
224. SnIONE DE BEAuVoiR, THE SECOND SEX 16 (H. M. Parshley ed. &
trans., 1953) ("She is defined and differentiated with reference to man and not
he with reference to her; she is the incidental, the inessential as opposed to
the essential. He is the Subject, he is the Absolute-she is the Other.")
(citation omitted).
225. Kenney, supra note 78, at 458.
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that "gender, unlike sex, is not found in nature, but created
and understood through representation."226
This view of the construction of masculinity as an identity
constructed in opposition to femininity is very much related to
a central theme in recent gaylegal and feminist theory, namely,
the theme of gender polarity.227 Scholars such as Sandra Bern
have argued that an important feature of the oppression of
women and sexual minorities is the cultural tendency to su-
perimpose a male/female dichotomy onto virtually every aspect
of social life, from the clothes we wear, to the products we buy,
to the way we express emotions and sexual desire.228 Mascu-
linity and femininity have been so thoroughly constructed as
opposites (as in the "opposite sex") that we often fail to see how
individuals fall on a continuum of personal styles, sexual orien-
tations, and behavioral traits and instead expect people to fol-
low "mutually exclusive scripts for being male and female."229
Perhaps most importantly, people who are seen as deviating
from the gender script-notably, gay men and lesbians-are
regarded as problematic and disruptive of good order.
This cultural tendency toward gender polarity poses a par-
ticular problem for the woman warrior. Unless the job of the
soldier is degendered, in the sense that the image of a "good
soldier" is no longer seen as exclusively male, we can expect
continued resistance to women in the military, particularly in
leadership roles. There has been powerful commentary de-
tailing how informal customs and traditions in the service
academies and during basic training construct a hypermascu-
line environment in which women are regarded as alien and
inferior.2 30 To my mind, however, the most critical reinforce-
226. Karst, supra note 51, at 503.
227. For discussions of the cultural effects of gender polarity, see, for ex-
ample, Fajer, supra note 12, at 630-31 ("[A]s long as we map sexual orienta-
tion to gendered traits-we will have trouble conceptualizing sexual orienta-
tion on a continuum."); Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against
Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 202
(1994) (arguing that the "prohibition of homosexuality preserves the polarities
of gender on which rests the subordination of women"); Catharine A. MacKin-
non, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 32, 44 (1987).
228. SANDRA LIPSITZ BEM, THE LENSES OF GENDER 80-132 (1993).
229. Id. at 81.
230. See Benecke & Dodge, supra note 223, at 236-37 (describing how con-
tempt for women is displayed by name calling, displays of pornography, cat-
calls and other methods); Fleming, supra note 219, at B5 (noting how "[tihe
very carriage required of people in the military is an exaggeration of the male,
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ment of gender polarity in the military is the policy of exclusion
of gays and lesbians.231 This is because the exclusion has the
effect of distorting and exaggerating problems associated with
gender integration of the services.
As I understand the discourse surrounding the recent sex
scandals and gender panic, a cognitive association has been
forged between the problem of sex and the problem of women-
thus, in the media, the problem of sexual harassment in the
military is discussed as if it were really a problem of men har-
assing women and the problem of adultery and fraternization
is thought to be really a problem of regulating heterosexual
relations. In this account, what is totally eclipsed is that sex-
ual harassment is not exclusively (or naturally) a male/female
phenomenon and that consensual sexual relationships may
also occur between people of the same sex.
There is a strange irony to this point. Because gays and
lesbians are not free to be open in the military, discussion
about military policies and practices takes place as if gay and
lesbian soldiers did not exist. Thus, I find it telling that in the
debate about fraternization within military units, 232 for exam-
ple, there seems to be an assumption that the element of sexu-
ality is introduced only when women are integrated into the
unit. By denying the possibility that the men in the unit may
have sexual contact, all problematic aspects of managing sexu-
ality get mapped onto women. It is not surprising, therefore,
that the solution to a sex scandal is to get rid of (or at least to
segregate) the women. In this respect, the military exclusion of
homosexuals represents the most extreme imposition of gender
rather than female, body language" and that "even the military uniforms are
made to flatter the male, rather than the female, figure"); Morris, supra note
52, at 716-20 (providing examples of the "unmistakable hostility" directed to-
ward women in the military culture such as T-shirts proclaiming to hate
women or the practice of calling male recruits "ladies" or "girls" when they
perform poorly in basic training).
231. Michele Benecke and Kirstin Dodge also regard the policy of exclud-
ing gays and lesbians as particularly harmful to women in the military. Their
analysis, however, focuses on the phenomenon of lesbian baiting and the con-
sequent investigations of large numbers of women suspected of being homo-
sexual. They make the important observation that women who reject sexual
advances by men are particularly vulnerable to being accused of being lesbi-
ans, thereby jeopardizing their military careers. They assert that this form of
sexual harassment of military women, both lesbian and heterosexual, is di-
rectly linked to the exclusionary policy and has had devastating effects on
military women in nontraditional jobs. See Benecke & Dodge, supra note 223,
at 222-33.
232. See supra notes 201-06 and accompanying text.
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polarity-the "don't ask, don't tell" policy assures that we will
not be able to break the link between women and sex and in-
creases the tendency to regard the military as a place where
both women and sex have no place.
The influence of gender polarity can also be discerned in
the discussion of sexual harassment in the military. From the
Tailhook scandal onward, sexual harassment has been de-
picted exclusively as a problem for female soldiers, with the
perpetrators invariably portrayed as heterosexual men. The
implicit reasoning is that because gay men are excluded from
the military, all harassers must be heterosexual. It is then a
short step to assume that it is men's heterosexuality that is
causing them to harass women, that is, that the harassment
really is about sex. Again, what is missing from this picture
are the stories of male-on-male sexual harassment that might
lead us to a different theory about the causes and remedies for
sexual harassment.
In the world outside the military, however, we are begin-
ing to glimpse the complexity of the phenomenon of sexual
harassment and to have a better understanding of what is
meant when it is said that harassment is about power, not sex.
This term the Supreme Court decided Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Services, Inc.,233 one of many same-sex sexual harass-
ment cases to reach the courts in recent years.234 Although the
facts of- Oncale are quite brutal, sadly it is not an atypical
same-sex harassment case.
The plaintiff in Oncale worked as a roustabout on an oil rig
off the Gulf Coast. He was the most junior man on his rig and
was subjected to repeated physical harassment by his supervi-
sor and other men on the rig.235 At one point, for example, On-
cale was pushed down by a co-worker and held in a squatting
position on his knees while his supervisor unzipped his pants
and stuck his penis onto the back of Oncale's head.236 Further,
233. 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998).
234. See id. at 1002. The percentage of sexual harassment charges filed by
males with the EEOC has also steadily increased, from 7.5% of all sexual har-
assment charges in 1991 to 11.6% of all such charges in 1997. See Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission, Sexual Harassment Charges, EEOC &
FEPAs Combined: FY 1991-1997 (Apr. 17, 1998). Because the EEOC does not
keep statistics on the gender of the alleged harasser, we do not know how
many of these charges involve male-on-male harassment.
235. The facts are most fully stated in the lower court opinion. See Oncale
v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996).
236. See id.
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the supervisor and a co-worker physically assaulted Oncale in
a sexual manner while he was in the shower and, on other oc-
casions, his co-workers threatened to rape him.237 In addition
to the physical abuse, Oncale's co-workers constantly picked on
him, sometimes increasing the physical danger of the job.238
Despite the clear pattern of harassment, Oncale initially lost
his sexual harassment suit because the Fifth Circuit took the
position that Title VII covered only "opposite sex" harass-
ment.239
The sexual harassment in Oncale took place in an exclu-
sively male workplace. The case proceeded on the assumption
that all of the men involved were heterosexual; significantly,
there were no allegations that any of the parties were homo-
sexual. The case thus presented the Court with what some
commentators regard as the most difficult scenario of harass-
ment-one that forced the Court to decide whether Title VII's
ban on sexual harassment covers male-on-male harassment in
a context that has nothing to do with sex, at least in the tradi-
tional sense of "sex" as "sexual desire." Some lower courts have
dismissed similar cases as not actionable, dismissively charac-
terizing male-on-male aggression as "horseplay"240 and "locker
room antics.1 241
In a brief unanimous opinion for the Court, Justice Scalia
held that Title VII was broad enough to encompass same-sex
sexual harassment. The opinion clearly stated that "harassing
conduct need not be motivated by sexual desire to support an
inference of discrimination on the basis of sex."242 This move
paved the way for recognition of same-sex harassment cases in
the great majority of such cases where there is no allegation or
finding that the harasser was homosexual and thus presuma-
237. See id. at 118-19 (stating that Oncale's supervisor pushed a bar of
soap into his anus while the co-worker restrained him).
238. See Brief of National Organization on Male Sexual Victimization, Inc.
et al., Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996)
(No. 96-568), reprinted in 8 U.C.L.A. WOmEN'S L.J. 9, 13 (1997) [hereinafter
Brief of National Organization on Male Sexual Victimization].
239. 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996).
240. See McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191,
1197 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 72 (1996).
241. See Tietgen v. Brown's Westminster Motors, Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1495,
1501 (E.D. Va. 1996) (contrasting the case at bar with McWilliams and Hop-
kins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 77 F.3d 740 (4th Cir. 1996)).
242. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998, 1002
(1998).
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bly motivated by sexual desire. The Court, however, did not
give much guidance as to how a plaintiff might prove sex-based
discrimination in an all-male workplace where the plaintiff
could not point to comparatively better treatment of the other
sex.243 The narrow opinion simply emphasized that a plaintiff
must prove more than that the targeted conduct was "merely
tinged with offensive sexual connotations,"244 and stressed that
"ordinary socializing in the workplace such as male-on-male
horseplay"245 was not actionable under Title VII. At the end of
the opinion, Justice Scalia expressed faith that "common sense,
and an appropriate sensitivity to social context"246 would allow
fact finders to distinguish between "simple teasing or rough-
housing between members of the same sex, and conduct which
a reasonable person in the plaintiffs position would find se-
verely hostile or abusive."247
Oncale is a threshold opinion that challenges the conven-
tional wisdom about sexual harassment, without endorsing a
coherent theory about its nature or origin. It is significant that
the Court seemed to embrace the feminist position that sexual
harassment is not necessarily about sexual desire and may
stem from hostility rather than attraction. But not surpris-
ingly given the procedural posture of the case,248 the Court did
not dwell on the power dynamics that might have been at play
in the very case before it. There was no discussion of why the
men on the oil rig might have singled out Oncale for hostile
treatment or what function the harassment performed in that
particular all-male culture. Most importantly, the Court did
243. The one example the Court offered was the highly unusual case of fe-
male-on-female harassment involving the use of "sex-specific and derogatory
terms by another woman as to make it clear that the harasser is motivated by
general hostility to the presence of women in the workplace." Id. Because
such hostility to the general presence of men in the workplace rarely exists,
the example tells us nothing useful about cases such as Oncale where the har-
assment is directed more specifically against those particular men who fail to
conform to gender norms or otherwise have less power than the men doing the
harassing.
24{ IM
245. Id. at 1003.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. The lower courts had dismissed the claim before trial on the ground
that same-sex sexual harassment was never actionable under Title VII. On-
cale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996). Thus,
the Court had only to decide whether any same-sex cases were cognizable un-
der Title VII. Oncale's case was remanded for trial.
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not explain how male-on-male harassment might be regarded
as sex-based discrimination when it seemed highly unlikely
that a female roustabout would have been welcomed in such an
environment. The Court enlarged the image of sexual harass-
ment beyond opposite-sex harassment, but did not speculate on
how this expanded concept might change our understanding of
what is sexual conduct. In other words, Oncale provides no
theory of sexuality or sexual aggression to supplant traditional
notions of sexuality such as sexual desire and attraction.
249
A cogent statement of such a theory can be found in an
amicus brief in Oncale authored by Catharine MacKinnon on
behalf of groups of male victims of rape and sexual abuse and
profeminist men's organizations.250 In the brief, MacKinnon
elaborates on her dominance theory of sexual harassment and
gives us new insight into the power dynamics behind sexual-
ized aggression. MacKinnon starts out by observing that men
are most often raped by other men when there are no women
around, "in prisons, in confined and isolated work sites, in
men's schools and colleges, in the military, in athletics, in fra-
ternities."251 It is important to recognize that MacKinnon
249. The amicus briefs filed on behalf of Oncale, however, presented rather
extensive arguments addressing the question of why same-sex sexual harass-
ment could be classified as sex-based, even if it did not stem from sexual at-
traction or class-wide animus against a gender group. In addition to the brief
authored by MacKinnon, discussed infra at notes 250-55, a group of law pro-
fessors (including myself) filed a brief arguing that same-sex sexual harass-
ment often consisted of a kind of stereotyping in which the target males were
singled out for abuse because they did not "live up to a stereotypic norm of
proper masculinity" or because they "objected to a hyper-masculine environ-
ment." See Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner
at 24-25, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir.
1996) (No. 96-568). The brief was authored by Katherine M. Franke & Nan D.
Hunter and based largely on Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong With Sexual
Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691 (1997).
250. See Marc S. Spindelman & John Stoltenberg, Oncale: Exposing Man-
hood, 8 U.C.L.A. WOMEN's L.J. 3, 5-6 (1997). MacKinnon's brief is published
in 8 U.C.L.A. WOMEN'S L.J. 9,19 (1997).
251. Brief of National Organization on Male Sexual Victimization, supra
note 238, at 19 (citing Michael B. King, Male Rape in Institutional Settings, in
MALE VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ASSAULT 67 (Gillian C. Mezey & Michael B. King
eds., 1992)); see also MARY ANN HUMPHREY, MY COUNTRY, MY RIGHT TO
SERVE 68 (1988) (describing sexual assaults on military men by individuals
who do not consider themselves gay); Judith Hicks Stiehm, Managing the
Military's Homosexual Exclusion Policy: Text and Subtext, 46 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 685, 701 (1992) (noting that "[in a hyper-macho environment, some non-
homosexuals believe that sodomizing other men is a means of demonstrating
their masculinity").
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would classify these rapes as "sexual" even though the rapists
regard themselves as heterosexual and are not motivated by
sexual desire. In other words, that the rapes are "power
rapes" 252 does not mean that they are not also sexual.
MacKinnon next theorizes that men sexually abuse those
persons over whom they have power: first women and children,
and then other men who are perceived as less powerful or dif-
ferent, based on, for example, their age, sexual orientation,
ethnicity or disability.253 What is perhaps most pernicious
about the sexual victimization of men, however, is its invisibil-
ity and the consequent cultural denial that such victimization
even exists:
The denial that interactions among men can have a sexual compo-
nent, and that sexual abuse of men is gendered, are twin features of
the social ideology of male dominance .... This image protects men
from much male sexual violence and naturalizes the sexual abuse of
women, making it seem that women, biologically, are sexual victims.
Denying that men can be sexually abused as men thus supports the
gender hierarchy of men over women in society. The illusion is pre-
served that men are sexually inviolable, hence naturally superior, as
the sexual abuse of men by men is kept invisible.24
MacKinnon's insights about the invisibility and denial of
the sexual abuse of men have potential for sharpening our un-
derstanding of how the dynamic of gender polarity might be at
work in the military. The exclusion of gay men would seem to
reinforce the belief that military men are sexually inviolable
and to heighten the belief that military women are naturally
sexual victims. In a culture that purports to be composed only
of "real" men, the sexual abuse of men, whether gay or hetero-
sexual, is likely to be driven further underground. MacKin-
non's theory explains, for example, why stories of male-on-male
sexual harassment in the military are less likely to surface in
the media and provide material for a sex scandal, unless, of
course, the perpetrator is discovered to be gay. Her theory
made me consider the possibility that military men might ex-
perience sexual harassment far more frequently than we might
252. For a discussion of the dynamics of "power rapes" in which men are
the victims, see A. Nicholas Groth & Ann Wolbert Burgess, Male Rape: Of-fenders and Victims, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 806, 808-09 (1980) (arguing that[slatisfaction and pleasure in male rape appear to be experienced in the
sense of power, the discharge of anger, and the erotization of aggression more
than in sexual release").
253. See Brief of National Organization on Male Sexual Victimization, su-
pra note 238, at 19.
254 Id. at 20-21 (citation omitted).
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suppose.255 It challenges us to consider what it might mean for
our understanding of sexual harassment if we truly learned
that women were not its cause.
In a curious way, the "discovery" of the sexual abuse of
men could be liberating for women. When rape and sexual
harassment are degendered, in the sense that we acknowledge
that men may also be victims and that same-sex sexual abuse
is not naturally linked to sexual orientation, some of the major
objections to women's presence in the military may lose their
force. For example, one recurring rationale for barring women
from combat is the fear that women will be taken as prisoners
of war and raped by enemy forces.256 While this fear is cer-
tainly justified, perhaps there should be comparable concern
over the prospect of sexual abuse of male prisoners of war as
well.257 The invisibility of the danger to men makes the poten-
tial harm to women seem not only intolerable but unique.
My main point is that once we understand that sexual
abuse is a problem in male-only, as well as integrated envi-
ronments, we might stop trying to solve the problem of sexual
abuse by excluding women. Most importantly, in the military
context, lifting the restrictions and discrimination against gay
men and lesbians would not only extend human rights to this
group of men and women, it might well facilitate gender inte-
gration generally.
255. In a recent survey conducted throughout the Army, 30% of male sol-
diers reported experiencing "unwanted sexual attention," and 8% reported
"sexual coercion." The comparable figures for female soldiers were 47% and
15%. See Philip Shenon, Army's Leadership Blamed in Report on Sexual
Abuses, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 12, 1997, at Al. This survey, of course, is unlikely
to include aggressive behavior that the targets themselves do not classify as
"sexual."
256. See Wayne E. Dillingham, The Possibility of American Military
Women Becoming Prisoners of War: Justification for Combat Exclusion
Rules?, 37 FED. B. NEws & J. 223 (1990). This concern has been very promi-
nent in Israel where the threat of war is always present and may account for
much of the reluctance to allow women to engage in combat, despite their im-
pressive record in combat prior to statehood. See Lief, supra note 110, at 48.
257. One commentator points out, for example, that both women and men
were sexually assaulted while being held captive by Iraqi forces during the
Persian Gulf war. See Frevola, supra note 49, at 644 n.146. Frevola describes
how, in response to the assaults, the Air Force instituted training on survival,
evasion, resistance, and escape for both female and male cadets to prepare
them for how to cope with sexual abuse if they are captured by enemy forces.
See id.
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CONCLUSION
The dizzying pace of events related to gender and the mili-
tary makes it tempting to reach for one explanation for the
chaos. Particularly in the popular commentary, there is a ten-
dency to fall back on simplistic views about sex to address diffi-
cult issues concerning training, ethics, and opportunities. The
backdrop of much of the public discussion of the "sex scandals"
in the military is the assumption that innate biological differ-
ences between men and women produce intractable problems
and that only separation of the sexes can ease the conflict.
This article proceeds from a much different premise. The
three theoretical frameworks I have used to deconstruct the re-
cent gender panic (tokenism, consent, and the social construc-
tion of gender) point to organizational structure and culture,
rather than to biology, for clues to understanding the heated
controversies relating to gender and the military that have ab-
sorbed the nation in the past year. If, as I suggest, the military
is a microcosm of larger society, it is not surprising that there
is a struggle over where to draw the line between permissible
and impermissible sexual conduct under military law, given
the contest between traditional and feminist viewpoints in the
civilian world.
One starting point for analysis is institutional demo-
graphics. To some degree, the current gender panic is a func-
tion of the still relatively low numbers of women in the mili-
tary. For the first time in history, the military is poised to go
beyond tokenism. Particularly because of the recent contrac-
tion of the combat exclusion, it is possible that women could se-
cure more than a marginal place in the armed forces in the
near future. From this vantage point, the gender panic-
particularly the move to resegregate the sexes during basic
training-represents a gender backlash. The unfortunate
irony is that, rather than being a cure for sexual harassment,
sex segregation is likely to foster and perpetuate sexual har-
assment.
Additionally, the recent courts-martial for sexual miscon-
duct and prosecutions for consensual sex demonstrate a need
to develop a new conception of sexual ethics in the military. In
my view, the guideposts for such a reconceptualization should
be principles of consent and gender equality, rather than tradi-
tional notions of sexual morality. The refinement of the
"constructive force" doctrine to prevent recruits from being
pressured to have sex with drill instructors against their will is
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important because it acknowledges the importance of power
differentials, of context, and of the perspective of rape victims.
However, particularly with respect to enforcement of its policy
against sexual harassment, the military's response is currently
limited by the ban against filing anti-discrimination civil suits.
The use of criminal sanctions, particularly long prison terms, is
too blunt a tool to control all forms of sexual misconduct. It can
backfire and deter even-handed enforcement of the law.
With respect to consensual sexual activity, the military's
rules on adultery and fraternization should be thoroughly
reexamined and redirected toward the concrete objectives of
eliminating sexual exploitation and conflicts of interest. Sex-
ual ethics within the military, like sexual ethics in the civilian
workplace, should be aimed at avoiding environmental harms,
rather than promoting more diffuse and contested notions of
morality. I recommend that the military follow the trend in
the larger society and eliminate all penalties for adultery as a
separate offense. Although more debatable, my analysis also
suggests that the ban against fraternization should be tailored
to reach only sexual relationships within the chain of com-
mand.
Finally, it is important to realize that managing sexuality
will be a problem for the military, with or without women. Re-
cent developments in Title VII same-sex sexual harassment
cases indicate that sexual harassment occurs in all-male, as
well as mixed-sex, environments and that sexual harassment
is best conceptualized as an abuse of power that can and does
harm both men and women. Because of their historic margi-
nalization within the military, however, women have a special
stake in transforming and de-gendering military culture, par-
ticularly in severing the connection between women and sex.
Such an important change, however, is not likely to occur un-
less and until the exclusion of gay men and lesbians is finally
lifted. Until then, exclusion and segregation of women will
look like a cure for male sexual misconduct and prevent us
from concluding, at long last, that the "experiment" with
women in the military has ended in success.
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